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CONFRONTING THE LOCAL LAND CHECKERBOARD
Daniel B. Rosenbaum *
INTRODUCTION
Fractured public land is hidden in plain sight. In communities
across the country, a patchwork assortment of local governments
share splintered ownership over surplus public properties, which
can be found scattered in residential neighborhoods and alongside
highways, in the shadows of development projects and in the scars
of urban renewal. The ripple effect of this fragmentation extends
across the spectrum of local governance. It creates needless costs
and bureaucratic headaches at a time of acute fiscal distress for
cities and counties. It contributes to an inequitable imbalance of
local power between formal and informal landowners in a community. And curiously, the operative legal regime enables the problem
while simultaneously muddying pragmatic ways to confront it.
This Article seeks to shed light upon the local land checkerboard—
and in doing so, the cluttered and opaque world of local government
law that it inhabits.
Our journey begins in Mechanicsville, a historic, largely residential neighborhood located just south of Atlanta’s downtown core.
Settled in the late nineteenth century, the neighborhood welcomed
waves of ethnically diverse residents over the following decades,
drawn by nearby railroad jobs and proximity to the downtown business district.1 Beginning around World War II, Mechanicsville experienced the familiar scourges of divestment, white flight, and urban renewal.2 Interstate highways pierced the neighborhood along
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. J.D., 2015
Harvard Law School. This Article benefitted immensely from its presentation at the AALS
New Voices in Property Law Program. The author is grateful to the program participants
for invaluable comments and suggestions and to Professors Cara Cunningham Warren, Gerald E. Frug, Richard Broughton, and Jacqueline Hand for their time, feedback, and support.
1. History, MECHANICSVILLE CIVIC ASS’N, https://mechanicsvilleatl.org/history/ [https:
//perma.cc/4ASS-4XF9].
2. Id.
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its northern and western borders, while urban renewal projects destroyed its built fabric and accelerated a population decline that
left Mechanicsville with only 2,300 residents in 1990, less than
25% of its 1960 level.3 In recent years another familiar trend came
to the neighborhood: gentrification. Today, bungalow and shotgun
homes sit alongside modern townhouse and condominium developments.4
As a legacy of its history, the landscape of Mechanicsville is
scarred by vacant land. Concentrated in the north of the neighborhood near Burney Park, this vacant land takes a variety of physical
forms: some is fenced off and well maintained; other land is hilly
and covered with brush and debris. Some sections of vacancy cover
entire city blocks; other sections are scattered between homes and
businesses. Less apparent to the casual observer is the ownership
status of these properties: the vacant land in Mechanicsville is predominantly owned by a variety of public entities. On Copper Street,
several lots on the east side of the road are owned by Fulton
County, which also owns several office and court buildings nearby.5
On the west side of the road, a large vacant parcel is owned by the
Atlanta Board of Education, a vestige of the segregated school for
local African-American children, Formwalt Elementary, that once
stood on the site.6 And just a half block south, a long vacant parcel
is owned by the City of Atlanta.7
The list of governmental owners in Mechanicsville only grows as
a hypothetical visitor continues walking south. Along with additional lots owned by the City of Atlanta and Fulton County, the
3. Id.
4. See Josh Green, First Look: South of Downtown, Row of 11 Townhomes Planned
with Gold Dome Views, CURBED ATLANTA (Apr. 7, 2020), https://atlanta.curbed.com/2020
/4/7/21210337/atlanta-townhome-for-sale-downtown-mechanicsville [https://perma.cc/GP52
-L8AP].
5. See, e.g., Search for Numbered Parcel Owned by Fulton County, CITY OF ATLANTA
PROP. INFO., https://gis.atlantaga.gov/propinfo/ [https://perma.cc/4Z9V-YVRG] (search “14
00760004154); id. [https://perma.cc/Y9ST-XLMD] (search “14 00760004029”).
6. See id. [https://perma.cc/8276-JSFQ] (search “14 00760004143”). Regarding
Formwalt School, see Traces of the Past: Neighborhood Schools and the Power of Place,
BURNAWAY MAG., https://burnaway.org/feature/neighborhood-schools-power-place/ [https://
perma.cc/2STN-Q4VK].
7. CITY OF ATLANTA PROP. INFO., supra note 5 [https://perma.cc/34U9-7HZW] (search
“1400760004051”). A search of historical satellite imagery indicates that a residential home
on the lot was demolished between 1968 and 1972. See Nationwide Environmental Title
Research, HISTORIC AERIALS, https://www.historicaerials.com/location/33.70254602695358/
-84.39188718795776/1955/17 [https://perma.cc/U6JN-9ZFJ] (search “445 Cooper Street SW,
Atlanta, Georgia,” select “compare,” select “slide,” and pick “1968” and “1972”).
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visitor will also come across vacant or underutilized land owned by
two regional authorities, the Atlanta Land Bank Authority and the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (“MARTA”).8 As
fractured as vacant land may appear to the neighborhood’s urban
fabric at street level, and as much as residents may expect fractured private ownership of vacant property, the fragmentation of
publicly owned land demands attention when assessing the state
of property in Mechanicsville today.
The case of Mechanicsville is hardly unique. In Chicago’s East
Garfield Park, another neighborhood scarred by white flight and
urban renewal,9 fractured public ownership can be found on a
block-by-block and parcel-by-parcel level. In one block of South
Whipple Street, for example, the City of Chicago owns seven vacant lots intermingled among five lots owned by the Cook County
Land Bank.10 What appears to the visitor as one large vacant property on the east side of South Whipple is in fact a checkered hodgepodge of city and land bank ownership.11
Fractured public land ownership is not merely the domain of
neighborhoods challenged by racial turnover and deindustrialization. Indeed, urban planning scholarship has demonstrated that
fragmented vacant property is a product of both population decline
and population growth.12 Los Angeles stands as a case in point.
Despite experiencing uninterrupted population growth over the
past century, almost 14,000 public properties are owned between
8. See, e.g., CITY OF ATLANTA PROP. INFO., supra note 5 [https://perma.cc/GA23-2DW8]
(search “14 01760005027”); id. [https://perma.cc/BFM6-KTKD] (search “14 00860002079”).
9. See Amanda Seligman, East Garfield Park, ELEC. ENCYC. OF CHI., https://www.enc
yclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/404.html [https://perma.cc/EU 9J-7B7Q].
10. See COOK CNTY. LAND BANK AUTH., https://public-cclba.epropertyplus.com/land
mgmtpub/app/base/landing [https://perma.cc/GM7N-QMTQ] (conducting searches for 17,
27, 33, 35, and 38 South Whipple Street); City-Owned Land Inventory, CHI. DATA PORTAL,
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Community-Economic-Development/City-Owned-Land-Inven
tory-Map/y5ck-7s96 [https://perma.cc/9EZQ-UNP4] (listing properties owned by the City of
Chicago, including 15, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26 South Whipple Street).
11. Comparable examples can be found elsewhere in East Garfield Park. The 3400 block
of West Walnut Street boasts two land bank properties scattered among nine city-owned
lots. See COOK CNTY. LAND BANK AUTH., supra note 10 [https://perma.cc/8H78-PMU7]
(searching for 3439 and 3453 West Walnut Street); CHICAGO DATA PORTAL, supra note 10
[https://perma.cc/M5CN-N935] (listing properties owned by the City of Chicago, including
3400, 3402, 3407, 3409, 3416, 3423, 3431, 3443, and 3451 West Walnut Street).
12. See Boah Kim & Galen Newman, The Spatial Effect of Civic Expansion on Vacant
Land Distribution in Fort Worth, Texas (Jan. 2014), in ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE
SCHOOLS OF PLANNING; Boah Kim & Galen Newman, Factors Influencing Urban Regeneration: An Analysis of Conversion of Non-Vacant Land Uses to Vacant (Oct. 2015), in
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF PLANNING.
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six main governmental entities in Los Angeles, and many of these
properties are vacant or underutilized.13 Just as in Mechanicsville
and East Garfield Park, examples exist in Los Angeles, too, where
vacant land in a given neighborhood has its ownership divided and
intermingled between multiple public owners.14
These examples underscore two rarely examined realities.15
First, local governments own vast amounts of land. While there are
no national-level studies of local public ownership,16 and few city13. Los Angeles is the only major American city that has attempted to comprehensively
identify and map all publicly owned property. See Los Angeles Office of the Controller, Data
Stories and Maps: Property Panel, https://lacontroller.org/data-stories-and-maps/property
panel/ [https://perma.cc/LJV4-XLXP]. While this report does not indicate vacant or underutilized properties, it estimates that the city owns about 10% of all vacant lots in Los
Angeles, see Alissa Walker, This Interactive Map Shows LA’s Publicly Owned Properties,
CURBED LOS ANGELES (July 3, 2019), https://la.curbed.com/2019/7/3/20681291/map-publicproperty-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/LMU4-GFGX] (noting that there are 22,000 vacant
lots in Los Angeles), it suggests that about 2,200 out of 7,508 total properties owned by the
city are vacant—or about 30%. See also Michael H. Kelly, Opinion, Why Does So Much CityOwned Land Sit Idle in Los Angeles?, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.latimes.
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kelly-los-angeles-city-owned-land-20180617-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/82YJ-PV9P] (criticizing the “vast real estate portfolio” of underutilized lots owned by
the city and other public entities).
14. See, e.g., Los Angeles Office of the Controller, supra note 13 (selecting parcels AIN
5168017902 and AIN 5168017900). These are adjacent vacant parcels on the east side of the
Los Angeles River. The former is owned by the City of Los Angeles, while the latter is owned
by Los Angeles County.
15. The academic literature’s engagement with fragmented public land has occurred
almost exclusively at the federal level, where fragmented federal landholdings in the American West have attracted considerable scholarship. See infra Part IV. This imbalance mirrors larger trends in the field of public land management, where scholarship focuses overwhelmingly on federal public land. See Steven M. Davis, The Politics of Urban Natural Areas
Management at the Local Level: A Case Study, 2 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RES. L. 127,
127 (2010) (“The centrality of local conservation lands in peoples’ everyday lives is certainly
not mirrored in public lands literature, which is disproportionately focused on federal
lands.”). But see Gabriel Eidelman, Failure When Fragmented: Public Land Ownership and
Waterfront Redevelopment in Chicago, Vancouver, and Toronto, 54 URB. AFF. REV. 697
(2018). Eidelman’s comparative account of waterfront development in Toronto, Vancouver,
and Chicago appears to be the only academic study in North America that directly examines
the effect of intergovernmental public land fragmentation. Id. According to Eidelman, Toronto’s failure to successfully develop its waterfront, when contrasted with the other two
cities, can be traced to the fragmented nature of its public land ownership. Id.
16. See Eidelman, supra note 15, at 701. Regrid (formerly Loveland Technologies), a
parcel mapping company, is attempting to map and collect data on all parcels in the
United States. See REGRID, https://landgrid.com/company [https://perma.cc/B3CR-NEY4].
See generally Earl F. Epstein & Bernard J. Niemann, MODERNIZING AMERICAN LAND
RECORDS: ORDER UPON CHAOS (2014). It appears that most of Regrid’s data is not managed
in real-time and therefore cannot serve as an accurate inventory of land ownership. Even
so, for purposes of this Article, it provides a representative snapshot of local public land
holdings. In fact, Regrid likely paints a conservative picture of public ownership because in
many jurisdictions, including all those cited below, a large number of properties lack ownership data altogether.
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level efforts to distill public property holdings,17 a review of public
parcel data indicates that local governments are significant landowners, particularly in legacy industrial cities.18 Public ownership
is lower in southern and western regions that boomed after World
War II and have suffered less from deindustrialization, but government entities still own large numbers of properties in these localities, as well.19 To an extent, of course, there is nothing remarkable
about local governments owning land. Property is required for city
halls, courts, parks, schools, transit centers, and convention facilities. It serves as the locus where government business is conducted
and where members of the public congregate. Yet much of the land
owned by public entities does not fulfill these functions, and instead can be considered surplus property—parcels that are vacant
or underutilized and are not being put to active use.20
17. A number of cities and counties release parcel maps of all properties within their
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Miami-Dade County Land Information Viewer, MIA.-DADE CNTY.,
https://gisweb.miamidade.gov/landinformation/ [https://perma.cc/ZBJ6-5NBS]. Yet these
maps generally do not generally distinguish between public and private ownership. Los Angeles is a rare example of a large local government specifically identifying and mapping all
publicly owned properties. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. In Baltimore, Regrid identifies 238,298 total parcels, of which a local public entity
(most notably the City of Baltimore and Housing Authority of Baltimore) owns 12,901 properties—over 5% of the city’s total. See United States Parcel Data, REGRID, https://app.regrid.com/us/#b=admin [https://perma.cc/P8ND-ZVQ5] (searching for “Baltimore, MD”). The
percentage is even higher in Youngstown, Ohio (7%), see id. [https://perma.cc/DBH9-87T7]
(searching for “Youngstown, OH”); St. Louis (10%), see id. [https://perma.cc/X9JC-XB2Z]
(searching for “St. Louis, MO”); and in Flint, Michigan, where a staggering 28% of parcels
are owned by local public entities, see id. [https://perma.cc/AJ9A-VE8D] (searching for
“Flint, MI”). In Birmingham, public entities—led by the City of Birmingham, the Birmingham Land Bank, the Housing Authority of Birmingham, and the Jefferson County—together own 7,500 parcels. See id. [https://perma.cc/9QJG-EMGP] (searching for “Birmingham, AL”).
19. In Miami-Dade County, Regrid identifies 579,551 total parcels, of which a local public entity (notably Miami-Dade County, the South Florida Water Management District, the
School Board of Miami-Dade County, and the City of Miami Beach) owns 9,521 parcels—an
appreciable amount of land, yet under 2% of the county’s total. See id. [https://perma.
cc/X5DF-MXLR] (searching for “Miami-Dade County, FL”). Local governments own at least
10,481 properties in Phoenix, see id. [https://perma.cc/X8ER-4WGE] (searching for “Phoenix, AZ”), 16,639 properties in Houston, see id. [https://perma.cc/8Z4V-D2NX] (searching for
“Houston, TX”), and at least 7,214 in San Diego, see id. [https://perma.cc/2JR3-N22N]
(searching for “San Diego, CA”).
20. As with public ownership more broadly, data is lacking with respect to vacant public
land. A study from 2,000 estimated that 15% of city land was vacant in the United States.
See Michael A. Pagano & Ann O’M. Bowman, Vacant Land in Cities: An Urban Resource,
CTR. ON URB. & METRO. POL’Y (Dec. 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up
loads/2016/06/paganofinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VVK-V2LC]. The study expressly included
city-owned vacant land in its survey but did not delineate between public and private property in the final analysis. See id. at 2. A review of parcel data suggests significant overlap
between public ownership and areas of a city that suffer from vacancy. In Houston, for
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Second, local public land is highly fragmented between a constellation of local governmental entities.21 This fragmentation is
purposeful and perhaps practical when considering nonsurplus
land: we expect that a school district owns the local public school,
while a park district owns the land used for a local park.22 When
considering surplus property, however, these presumptions dissipate, along with the statutory mandates that may underpin
them.23 An unused parcel of land might ideally be owned and managed by a local land bank or redevelopment authority.24 Yet in
practice, surplus parcels can be found scattered and fractured
amongst a number of local government owners.25
example, the Settegast neighborhood is plagued with vacant land. Luis Guajardo, Settegast:
A Case Study in Endemic Racism Within Houston’s Housing System, KINDER INST. FOR URB.
RSCH. (July 2, 2020), https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2020/07/02/housing-inequality-sette
gast-racism-within-houston-redlining [https://perma.cc/8Z7K-EUM3]. It is also pocketed by
dozens of publicly owned lots, split primarily between the City of Houston and the Houston
Land Bank. See United States Parcel Data, supra note 18 [https://perma.cc/8Z4V-D2NX]
(searching for “Houston, TX”). In Chicago, city-owned properties are concentrated in Englewood, North Lawndale, East Garfield Park, and Grand Boulevard, all neighborhoods severely affected by vacancy. See CHI. DATA PORTAL, supra note 11. The city does not distinguish the number of vacant parcels it owns, but it has offered over 4,000 vacant lots for sale
in these same neighborhoods in recent years. See Jay Koziarz, City of Chicago to Expand $1
Lot Program to 4,000 Vacant Properties, CURBED CHICAGO (Nov. 29, 2016), https://chicago.
curbed.com/2016/11/29/13776394/chicago-real-estate-news-city-expands-dollar-lot-program
-west-south-side [https://perma.cc/X6CU-SHS4].
21. See supra notes 18–19 (listing various public owners in Birmingham and MiamiDade). In San Diego, local public owners include the City of San Diego, the County of San
Diego, the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board, the San Diego Unified
School District, the San Diego Unified Port District, the San Diego Housing Commission,
the San Diego County Water Authority, and a number of other water districts, school districts, and municipalities. See United States Parcel Data, supra note 18 [https://perma.
cc/2JR3-N22N] (searching for “San Diego, CA”).
22. But see Nadav Shoked, An American Oddity: The Law, History, and Toll of the
School District, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 945 (2017) (advocating abolition of school districts).
23. In some jurisdictions, “surplus property” is a technical term: property is designated
surplus by administrators or policymakers, a process subject to criticism for politicized decision making. See Katie Wells, Policyfailing: The Case of Public Property Disposal in Washington, D.C., 13 ACME: INT’L J. FOR CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIES 473, 483 (2014). For purposes
of this Article, the term “surplus property” is not used to track any technical definition or
application, but is rather used as a purely descriptive term for public property, often vacant,
that is unused or underutilized and in either case is not being committed to an active purpose. But see infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing community gardens and critiquing articulations of “surplus” or “vacant” land).
24. See Anne E. Kline, A Case for Connecticut Land Banks, 88 CONN. B.J. 210, 215
(2015) (advocating for land bank legislation and noting that “[a]cquisition of properties is a
fundamental function of a land bank”).
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In Chicago, for example, the City is not
the only local entity to implement a program for selling vacant lots. See Corilyn Shropshire,
Cook County Selling Nearly 3,200 Vacant Lots to Encourage Redevelopment, CHI. TRIB. (May
1, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-cook-county-land-bank-offers-vacant-
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Taken together, these facts yield an inescapable conclusion: public land fragmentation between local government owners is a widespread phenomenon, not limited only to Mechanicsville and East
Garfield Park but a facet of the public landscape in communities
across the United States. This Article aims to illuminate the local
land checkerboard. It first explores why fragmented public land is
problematic, both for the governments that own these parcels and
for the communities that have stewarded them. It then draws upon
federal law to offer a pragmatic solution: using land exchanges between local entities to consolidate public property holdings. A specific type of federal land exchange—the “assembled exchange,”
which involves more than two parties and may occur over a period
of time—offers an especially dynamic model for tackling fragmentation while also promoting property law values of efficiency, sharing, and collaboration. The Article thus advocates for assembled
exchanges as a form of adaptive governance.
In advocating for local land exchanges, however, the Article
must confront and navigate the muddled legal framework that governs a local government’s authority to exchange property, and in
particular its authority to engage in interlocal land exchanges with
other government entities. This framework counterintuitively and
irrationally creates a shakier legal basis for interlocal land exchanges when compared with exchanges made between a government owner and a private party. Addressing the legality of local
exchanges provides an opportunity to explore the broader issue of
opaque local government power. What observers might perceive or
assume as a far-reaching local mandate may, in reality, reflect a
grant drawn opaquely by state law and ultimately limited in its
interpretation by courts.26 As a consequence, a chasm forms between the power a local government was intended to hold—and arguably should or might hold—and the locality’s ability to act in
that space, yielding a model of governance that is more expansive

lots-20180501-story.html [https://perma.cc/KYW8-KZRQ].
26. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Nadav Shoked, Comparative Local Government Law in
Motion: How Different Local Government Law Regimes Affect Global Cities’ Bike Share
Plans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123, 149 (2014) (discussing the general concept of opaque local
power and the leeway given courts to limit home rule; concluding that “arguably, . . . in New
York the opacity of the lines drawn by the state for the scope of city powers led to further
restriction, rather than expansion, of local powers”).
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in theory than it is in practice.27 Land exchanges offer a striking
case study of the issue.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the question
left unanswered in this Introduction: why is local public land so
fragmented between public entities? This Part broadly describes
the two overarching sources of local fragmentation, first the legal
and political framework that causes property to be fragmented geographically in a given jurisdiction, and second the factors that
have created a variety and redundancy of local government owners.
Part II makes the case for public land consolidation. It draws
upon property theory and local government practice to assess why
land fragmentation adversely affects the governance, administration, and productivity of public property. This Part illustrates how
fragmentation is more often a liability than an asset. For local governments, fragmentation imperils both management and development objectives by imposing costs and inefficiencies upon financially strapped entities. For residents of the community,
meanwhile, fragmentation threatens spaces of collective stewardship and fosters an inequitable imbalance of local power.
Part III turns to the Article’s core prescriptive question: What
can be done to remedy the fragmentation of surplus public land
between governmental owners? This Part explores three possible
remedies—ownership consolidation, interlocal agreements, and
land exchanges—and posits that the first two face significant hurdles inherent to the structure of local government, whereas the
third, land exchanges, offers a path forward less constrained by
these defects. This Part then examines and advocates for assembled land exchanges, which offer an adaptive exchange model
rooted in collaboration and shared governance.
Part IV looks at the approach taken by the federal government
to consolidate federally owned property. Under the Federal Land
and Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”), federal agencies administer a process whereby exchanges are proposed, reviewed, and effectuated in the interest of reducing public land fragmentation. Exchanges made pursuant to the FLPMA—known as “administrative
27. See id. (discussing the “local empowerment continuum”); see also Ryan B. Stoa, Water Governance in Haiti: An Assessment of Laws and Institutional Capacities, 29 TUL. ENV’T
L.J. 243, 265 (2017) (positing that opaque legal mandates may functionally limit local action
in practice).
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exchanges”—reflect a proven and systematic effort, albeit an imperfect one, to address the federal land checkerboard. This Part
concludes by arguing that the federal model could be instructive at
the local level.
In light of the problems posed by local fragmentation and the
merits of interlocal exchanges, Part V examines the operative
question of local power: what legal authority do local governments
hold to exchange property with each other? This Part demonstrates
that state law and judicial doctrine have created a muddled legal
regime stemming from an inconsistent approach to the basic concept of land exchanges. Legislatures and courts equivocate between defining exchanges as a unique mechanism for transferring
property and defining them as part and parcel of the property acquisition and sale processes. In many states, as a result of this inconsistency, it is not clear that local entities are empowered to engage in interlocal exchanges, while in other states local exchange
authority is unduly limited by burdensome procedural requirements. The Article concludes by proposing elements of the federal
land exchange model that could be applied at the local level to clarify the legal regime of interlocal exchanges, as a consequence also
facilitating and promoting exchanges as a conscious response to
public land fragmentation.
I. THE FRAGMENTATION OF LOCAL PUBLIC LAND
Why is local public land so fragmented? When examining the
question on a small scale, in the context of a given neighborhood,
the historical record often paints a straightforward picture of fractures within public land ownership. In Mechanicsville, for example, a vacant lot on the east side of Copper Street is owned by the
Board of Education because a school once sat on the site, while a
lot across the street is owned by Fulton County because it is adjacent to other land that houses County courts and offices.28 In both
cases, the vacant properties are tied to their governmental owners
by virtue of a historical use or development. When the use at issue
moved elsewhere, the lot became unintentionally vacant. The aggregate effects of these unanticipated land use changes, assessed
across a neighborhood or city, unsurprisingly create fractured public ownership over time.

28.

See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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Yet on a larger scale, broader structural, legal, and political factors promote these accidents of nonuse, encouraging both the existence of surplus properties and the splintering of these properties
into the hands of different public owners.
A. Fragmentation by Geography
Land fragmentation occurs most palpably on a geographic level.
The landscape of a community or neighborhood bears witness to
the diverse types of property owned by local governments operating in that jurisdiction, as well as the diverse locations where public properties can be found. A couple sources of this fragmentation
are readily apparent. First, fragmented land is a product of demographic change: both population growth and population decline
create fractured parcels—often termed “residual parcels”—that ultimately come under local public ownership.29 Second, fractured
parcels are a legacy of anti-urban and racially motivated planning
decisions of the twentieth century,30 notably highway construction
and urban renewal, that slashed through the existing urban fabric
to construct large housing and infrastructure projects, in their
wake leaving residual parcels that remain in local public ownership to this day.31
The expansive geographic diversity of local landholding is also
grounded in the broad latitude given to local governments when
acquiring and selling property. General purpose governments may
be empowered under state law or the home rule provision of a state
constitution to obtain properties for “city purposes” or “public use,”
broad directives that enjoy deference in court.32 Cities also receive
29. See generally Kim & Newman, supra note 12.
30. See Amy Laura Cahn & Paula Z. Segal, You Can’t Common What You Can’t See:
Towards a Restorative Polycentrism in the Governance of Our Cities, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
195, 201 (2016).
31. See generally Crumpacker v. State, 271 N.E.2d 716, 717 (Ind. 1971) (discussing residual parcels created from the construction of a highway); Gideon Kanner, Detroit and the
Decline of Urban America, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1547, 1559 (2013) (discussing urban renewal and its destruction of the traditional street grid).
32. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1800 (Repl. Vol. 2018) (“public use”). At the same
time, some statutory grants do not contain any express public purpose limitations. See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.11.010 (2021) (a city may “acquire real and personal property of
every kind”). Similar provisions also apply to county property. See, e.g., id. § 36.34.130
(county power to acquire and dispose of property via intergovernmental transfer). Property
acquisition is also limited by constitutional and due process requirements, for example when
obtaining property via foreclosure or eminent domain. See Kellen Zale, The Government’s
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broad deference when selling public property, particularly where
the property is considered surplus in nature.33 Similarly, special
purpose governments are often granted power to own and dispose
of property so long they act consonant with the broad purposes of
their authorizing statutes.34
As a result of this latitude, local entities enjoy few constraints
when making decisions about property they own or are deciding to
acquire.35 The lack of a regulatory framework yields instead to a
model of ad hoc, politicized decision making. Legal scholars have
critiqued local land use decisions as inconsistent, driven by narrow
interests, and highly political.36 These critiques apply as well to
decisions made about publicly owned property more specifically.
When a local government is acquiring property, it is susceptible to
rosy economic development forecasts that regularly do not come to
fruition.37 When selling a property, meanwhile, a local government
is prone to capture by factions of the public, notably neighbors and
Right to Destroy, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 274 (2015). A number of home rule grants are interpreted expansively in the local government’s favor, although this liberal construction is not
applied consistently by courts. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Meghan Zimmerman Gough &
Robert Puentes, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URB. & METRO. POL’Y, IS HOME RULE THE
ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON’S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 6, 20–
21 (Jan. 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/dillonsrule.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/LCQ4-DTP9].
33. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-76-1, 76-4.1, 76-4.2 (2021) (all authorizing and
setting forth processes for the sale of surplus municipal property in Illinois); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 721.01 (LexisNexis 2021) (authority for municipalities to sell property “not
needed for any municipal purpose”); see also Max Schanzenbach & Nadav Shoked, Reclaiming Fiduciary Law for the City, 70 STAN. L. REV. 565, 569 (2018); id. at 592 (explaining that
some courts view a city selling surplus assets as reflecting a prudent business decision).
34. See, e.g., Southside Water & Sewer Dist. v. Murphy, 555 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Idaho
1976) (citing IDAHO CODE § 42-3212 (2021)) (sewer district has “authority to acquire property to carry out its public purposes”); Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d
655, 663 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing transit authority power to buy and sell property); State
ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Mo. 2013) (port authority “has the authority
to acquire property necessary to its purposes”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4582.31 (LexisNexis
2021) (port authority can buy, own, and sell property “in furtherance of any authorized purpose”).
35. Davis, supra note 15, at 147 (“Simply put, land managers at the city and county
level tend to be far less constrained by legislative or regulatory guidelines and requirements
than federal managers.”).
36. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1709–14 (2013); Patricia E. Salkin, Back to Kindergarten: Pay Attention, Listen, and Play Fair with Others—
Skills That Translate into Ethical Conduct in Planning and Zoning Decision Making—A
Summary of Recent Cases and Decisions on Ethics in Land Use Law, 37 URB. LAW. 573
(2005).
37. Frank Schnidman, Land Assembly by Assembling People, SP006 ALI-ABA 1, 11
(2009) (discussing “but a few examples of municipal land speculation, underwritten by taxpayers, which were never economically sustainable”).
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developers, who do not reflect the interests of the community at
large.38 Local entities also sell property in order to advance shortterm political or fiscal goals, absent any cohesive long-term sensibility.39
Land fragmentation comes as an unsurprising side-effect when
decisions about property acquisition and disposition are made in
an ad hoc manner.40 Promoting cohesive and consolidated public
land policies requires a government to make long-term decisions
on an issue that rarely resonates in the public consciousness.41
Without meaningful legislative or judicial parameters, these longterm decisions do not occur. Instead, individual properties are acquired and sold for shifting political reasons, an approach that only
coincidentally may ensure geographic consolidation of ownership.42
This is especially the case where underutilized property is concerned. Acting on the belief or posture that growth policies can be
implemented on underutilized land,43 local governments take on
38. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use”
Failed, 18 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 405, 407–08 (1994) (arguing that public choice theory, which
posits that special interest groups disproportionately impact policymaking, is “particularly
relevant in the case of public lands”). This hearkens to the Madisonian concept of undue
factional influence in government. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal
Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 854 (1983).
39. Schanzenbach & Shoked, supra note 33, at 571–72. Local leaders are responsive to
current voters, not future ones, and therefore are incentivized to prioritize decisions with
immediate benefit that might be harmful in the future. See Clayton P. Gillette, Can Municipal Political Structure Improve Fiscal Performance?, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 571, 572
(2014).
40. See Scott K. Miller, Missing the Forest and the Trees: Lost Opportunities for Federal
Land Exchanges, 38 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 197, 208–09 (2013) (noting, in the federal land context, that disjointed acquisition and disposition approaches yielded public land fragmentation).
41. Land fragmentation at the federal level enjoyed a period of notoriety in the 1990s.
See Smith Monson, Note, Treating the Blue Rash: Win-Win Solutions and Improving the
Land Exchange Process, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 241, 259 (2015) (discussing the critiques that
preceded a report by the General Accounting Office in 2009 regarding fragmented federal
land). On the local level, fragmentation does boil over at times into public perception and
frustration, as demonstrated recently in Philadelphia. See infra note 108 and accompanying
text. But such examples can be considered rare in light of the widespread problem of fragmented public property more generally.
42. A possible exception is when a governmental entity embarks on a land assembly
project for purposes of a development, often via use of eminent domain. These projects, however, are necessarily still short-term in nature, driven by the objective of the development
rather than by the goal of long-term public land consolidation. See James J. Kelly, Jr., A
Continuum in Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Market, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 109, 111 (2013) (describing eminent domain as “usually driven by a massive new
building project”).
43. Robert Mark Silverman, Li Yin & Kelly L. Patterson, Municipal Property
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these properties speculatively, acquiring them through foreclosure, eminent domain, nuisance abatement actions, and other
forms of blight and vacant property enforcement.44 Each of these
acquisition vehicles carries its own legal process, which in many
cases turns on the internal practices of the governmental entity
itself.45 Due to the divergent and multifaceted acquisition methods
at their disposal, governments end up with fragmented land holdings as these practices and acquisition methods are variously applied and aggregated over time, fluctuating alongside shifting assessments of cost and political risk.46
B. Fragmentation by Ownership
Geographic fragmentation of public land is only half the story.
As illustrated by the examples of Mechanicsville and East Garfield
Park, publicly owned property is not simply fragmented geographically, but it is also fragmented between local government owners.
This fragmentation of ownership can be explained by the crowded
playing field of modern local governance. A staggering number of
local public entities operate in the United States today; in any
given community, there are likely multiple local entities that share
overlapping or coterminous jurisdictions and are authorized, if not
empowered, to own surplus property.47

Acquisition Patterns in a Shrinking City: Evidence for the Persistence of an Urban Growth
Paradigm in Buffalo, N.Y., COGENT SOC. SCIS., Feb. 13, 2015, at 3 (discussing the sometimes
false assumption held by governmental leaders that growth is a constant and shrinking
neighborhoods or cities is a temporary aberration; as a result, public entities take on abandoned properties that face insurmountable challenges).
44. See Michele Steinberg & Meghan Housewright, Addressing Vacant Property in the
Wildland Urban Interface, 55 IDAHO L. REV. 59, 68, 71–72 (2019).
45. See Lavea Brachman, Vacant and Abandoned Property: Remedies for Acquisition
and Redevelopment, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y (Oct. 2005), https://www.lincolninst.edu
/publications/articles/vacant-abandoned-property [https://perma.cc/ZC33-CDXX] (discussing code enforcement, eminent domain, nuisance abatement, and tax foreclosure).
46. See Kelly, supra note 42, at 111, 115–16, 120 (examining the different types of property acquired under various acquisition approaches to underutilized land; for example, code
enforcement receivership is designed for vacant buildings, whereas nuisance abatement
laws are targeted at hazardous structures and eminent domain is a potentially “unnecessarily drastic” and “nuclear option” that is overinclusive of the properties and property
rights it captures).
47. According to 2017 census figures, over 38,000 general purpose and 51,000 special
purpose local governments exist in the United States, yielding a sum of 90,075 local entities.
By way of comparison, county governments—the default form of local administration—comprise only 3,031, or about 3%, of this figure. 2017 Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS
(Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html
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Scholars have long assailed the legal conditions that give rise to
a multiplicity and duplicity of local government entities.48 Local
governments are relatively easy to create yet can be difficult to
abolish or dissolve, yielding on balance a one-way ratchet towards
increasing numbers of public entities.49 The ratchet is particularly
prominent where surplus public land is involved.50 Over the past
half century, states have passed a rash of legislative enactments
designed to tackle the causes or effects of underutilized and vacant
public property.51 These acts have bred a scattered and sometimes
duplicitous landscape of special purpose entities that share a general mission of repurposing distressed, vacant, or unutilized local
land—while at the same time holding different powers and governance structures.52 Legal commentators and policymakers alike

[https://perma.cc/3BBU-V842].
48. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1171 (1996); Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 93‒97 (2003);
see also Colin Gordon, Patchwork Metropolis: Fragmented Governance and Urban Decline
in Greater St. Louis, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 66 (2014) (“Urban historians and urban
scholars generally agree that patchwork governance has been disastrous for American cities.”).
49. With respect to incorporation, see Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 647, 666 (2014) (“While incorporation standards in some states
can place a high burden on those endeavoring to create a new city, in most states it is relatively easy to incorporate, and while several legal prerequisites may need to be satisfied,
incorporation is generally available. . . . [I]n most states, individual property owners control
municipal boundary formation and reformation.”); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1782‒83 (2002) (regarding special purpose governments).
With respect to dissolution, in many states a municipality’s population must fall below a
certain threshold before it can be dissolved. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities,
121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1380 (2012) (arguing that these population thresholds “have effectively
limited dissolution to ghost towns or rural enclaves”). Special purpose entities, meanwhile,
often shirk traditional means of political accountability, giving stakeholders latitude to keep
an entity alive even if its purpose has become redundant or counterproductive. See Sara C.
Galvan, Wrestling with Muds to Pin Down the Truth About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3041, 3070 (2007).
50. A closely related issue, yet tangential to the scope of this Article, is the fragmentation of land use regulation that occurs as a consequence of local government fragmentation,
yielding ad hoc, inequitable decision-making. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the
Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 213 (2016); Briffault, supra note 48, at 1133;
Gordon, supra note 48, at 70.
51. See, e.g., Richard A. King, The Continuing Battle to Curb Urban Blight and the Use
of Economic Activity Taxes, 51 J. MO. BAR 332 (1995) (discussing the “wide-ranging legislative enactments” passed in Missouri to address blight and divestment, including acts targeting surplus public land).
52. Peter Salsich, Rex Gradeless, Laura Schwarz & Kathleen Zahn, Affordable Workforce Housing—An Agenda for the Show Me State: A Report from an Interactive Forum on
Housing Issues in Missouri, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 45, 64 (2007) (“[T]he large number
of separate agencies may be traceable, in part, to enabling legislation requirements . . . .”).
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have advocated in recent years for land banks to act as the primary
entity for managing surplus land.53 Where authorized by state
statute,54 land banks serve in theory as ideal repositories for consolidated public property because they are delegated express powers to obtain, manage, and dispose of tax-delinquent property, usually with corollary powers to clear title clouds from those parcels
and thereby promote their redevelopment.55 Yet in practice, land
banks add another public owner and layer of local administration
to the governance mix. Even in regions where a land bank has been
conferred broad powers and enjoys strong political support, fragmentation of surplus public land nevertheless persists.56
The degree to which public land is fragmented in Mechanicsville
and East Garfield Park should ultimately come as little surprise.
Viewed in tandem, the geographic fragmentation of land and the
administrative fragmentation of ownership together create an optimal recipe for the local land checkerboard that has developed—a
checkerboard that epitomizes both the splintered structure of local
government and the accretion of shifting policy decisions made
over time.

As the authors note, St. Louis has three local entities tasked with economic development,
with one of these, the St. Louis Development Corporation, in turn serving as the umbrella
organization for several additional agencies that manage surplus public land in the city
more specifically. Id.; see also Frank S. Alexander, Land Bank Strategies for Renewing Urban Land, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 140, 147 (2005).
53. See Alexander, supra note 52, at 146. The number of land bank in the United States
has ballooned in recent years. See National Land Bank Map, CTR. FOR CMTY. PROGRESS,
https://communityprogress.org/resources/land-banks/national-land-bank-map [https://perm
a.cc/KD5B-5L3H] (noting that fourteen states passed land bank enabling legislation between 2011 and 2019).
54. As creatures of the state, land banks generally require express statutory authorization, although at times land banks have been created using powers already existing at the
local level. See Alexander, supra note 52, at 149.
55. Alexander, supra note 52, at 150; Kline, supra note 24, at 214; Stuart Pratt, A Proposal for Land Bank Legislation in North Carolina, 89 N.C. L. REV. 568, 591 (2011).
56. One of the most highly touted and successful land banks is the Genesee County
Land Bank in Flint, Michigan. See Sorell E. Negro, You Can Take It to the Bank: The Role
of Land Banking in Dealing with Distressed Properties, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Sept. 2012,
at 1, 4–5; Diana A. Silva, Land Banking as A Tool for the Economic Redevelopment of Older
Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 608 (2011). Even so, while the Land Bank has become the dominant public owner in Genesee County with over 14,000 parcels, data from
Regrid indicates that four of the top five landowners in Genesee County are local public
entities, with the City of Flint still owning over 1,500 properties. United States Parcel Data,
supra note 18 [https://perma.cc/TYD8-6SRC] (searching for “Genesee County, MI”).
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II. THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTED LAND
The widespread and ingrained nature of fragmented public property should not, however, obscure the adverse effects of this status
quo. Once fragmented, public lands pose significant burdens on
their governmental owners and local neighbors. This Part canvasses the academic literature to explore why these burdens exist.
It then examines why the issue is particularly acute where local
land is splintered between multiple public owners.
A. Land Fragmentation in Theory
In an optimal ordering of property ownership, property rights
are created—and borders are drawn—such that owners can realize
both the benefits and costs of holding property rights, thus incentivizing the internalization of the latter by virtue of the former.57
Fragmented property upends this allocation. As property becomes
more fragmented, its value diminishes while transaction costs rise,
thereby threatening the utility of the resource.58 Furthermore, because dividing property is easier than combining it, fragmentation
can make the cost-benefit allocation of ownership difficult to correct in the future.59
Viewed through the lens of property rights, fragmentation adversely impacts quintessential rights of property ownership, most
notably the right to use a resource and the right to exclude others
from it.60 By their very geographic nature, fragment parcels are
challenging to use. Many are landlocked or access-constrained.61
Those in urban areas are generally small.62 And by virtue of their
57. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356
(1967).
58. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1165–
66 (1999).
59. See id.
60. J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 741
(1996) (defining the “right to use” as the first of the “bundle of rights” that comprises property); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (regarding the right
to exclude). But see Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP.
L. REV. 665, 672 (2011) (noting limits on the right to exclude from unimproved land).
61. Merry J. Chavez, Note, Public Access to Landlocked Public Lands, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1373–74, 1378, 1389 (1987) (estimating that one-third of federal lands in the West are
landlocked, stemming from checkboard land development during the nineteenth century).
62. Jaime Bouvier, How Cities Are Responding to the Urban Agriculture Movement with
Micro-Livestock Ordinances, 47 URB. LAW. 85, 92 (2015).
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accidental histories, fragment parcels can be irregular in shape.63
Taken together, these impediments discourage owners from pursuing most, if not all, practical uses for the land.64 Even open space
and recreational uses are difficult where the property cannot be
easily entered by the owner or the public, or where space and size
constraints prevent productive investment into the property.65
Problematic geography also poses obstacles when trying to determine the exact contours of a parcel in the first place. As property
and ownership become fragmented, surveys grow challenging and
costly, creating more room for error with respect to basic property
data.66 The issue is a particularly acute one for local governments,
many of which struggle with the preliminary task of identifying
what properties they own.67 In this manner, limitations on an
owner’s ability to use fragment property necessarily bleed into that
owner’s right of exclusion. If the property is small, difficult to access, and irregularly shaped, and if surveys and ownership data
prove costly, incorrect, or unhelpful, the owner faces a daunting
task when policing its boundaries and excluding others from the
land. Fragmented urban properties are especially threatened by
surrounding developments and use encroachments.68
In academic literature, the rights of exclusion and use intersect
in a particularly wasteful manner when a resource is fragmented
between multiple owners, each of whom may hold a distinct vision
for how that resource should be managed. If several owners—or
indeed, the vast majority of owners—want to put the resource to a
certain use, even one holdout may decide to exclude that use, effectively preventing the plan from going forward. This situation is

63. Miller, supra note 40, at 211 (discussing federal lands).
64. See, e.g., Finn v. Mayor of Norwood, 545 A.2d 807, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (city trying to consolidate “[a] number of very small isolated lots”).
65. Chavez, supra note 61, at 1389 (discussing recreation use on access-constrained federal land). Regarding access challenges on federal land, see also Miller, supra note 40, at
213.
66. See Miller, supra note 40, at 214 (citing the expensive surveys required on fragmented federal land); Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1172 (2014) (discussing the “chronic disarray” of data in Detroit regarding property
ownership in the context of small parcels of excess public land).
67. See Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It’s Time to Protect
This Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475, 489 (1998); Steinberg & Housewright,
supra note 44, at 66.
68. Davis, supra note 15, at 134–35.
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described as the tragedy of the anticommons.69 In the context of
urban land, the resource in question might be a block or neighborhood of small, underutilized, and checkerboard parcels where any
development requires unanimous collective action.70 If one owner
is attempting to assemble the parcels for development, each owner
of the surrounding checkered lots can act as a holdout, wielding
veto power over the project.71
The result is functional underuse of a fragmented property.72
Under optimal market conditions, holdout owners and other transaction costs can be overcome through bargaining, but when dealing
with checkered urban parcels, the underlying value of each parcel
may be too low to surmount the transaction costs entailed.73 Similarly, small and underutilized lots pose outsized negative externalities on surrounding properties.74 Blight on one lot affects the value
of the lot next door, depressing market values across fragmented
boundaries and giving owners less incentive to individually invest
in their properties, even as transaction costs remain high.75 In a
sense, then, an urban anticommons creates a positive feedback
loop of gridlock: collective action is required for development,
which imperils the ability for development to occur, thereby weakening property values and diminishing the chance that traditional
redevelopment can ever be viable as an initial matter.76

69. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668 (1998). The concept of a property anticommons
operates on multiple levels, including fragmented ownership rights in a given parcel or fragmented ownership in a given neighborhood. James J. Kelly, Jr., Freeing the City to Compete,
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 569, 571 (2017); see also id. at 578 (“The fragmented neighborhood is
a spatial anticommons.”).
70. Kelly, supra note 69, at 572 (discussing urban anticommons operating at the neighborhood level); see also James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be Moved”: Urban Communities,
Eminent Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923,
963–64 (2006) (“Just as individual properties with many owners can serve as exemplars of
the anticommons, blighted neighborhoods also can be seen as the victims of over-fractionation.”); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1469
(2008).
71. Heller & Hills, supra note 70, at 1468.
72. Id. at 1469.
73. Kelly, supra note 69, at 572.
74. Kelly, supra note 42, at 119.
75. Id. Along these lines, urban infill development poses a number of legal, transactional, and political costs more broadly. See J. Terrence Farris, The Barriers to Using Urban
Infill Development to Achieve Smart Growth, 12 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 1 (2001).
76. Farris, supra note 75, at 7, 11; see also Michael A. Heller, supra note 58, at 1165–
66.
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In short, in the case of checkerboard properties, it is difficult for
a public owner to achieve a productive use of the land without addressing the underlying issue of fragmentation or suffering from
its side effects along the way. For local governments beset by funding shortfalls,77 maintaining surplus property already creates significant cost and liability.78 Adding inefficiencies atop these costs
only strains their maintenance capacities further.79
B. Land Fragmentation Between Local Governments
The costs bred by property fragmentation are particularly acute
when land is not simply fragmented in a vacuum, but more specifically has seen its ownership fracture between two or more local
government entities. Public owners bring disparate policies, practices, and mandates to the lands they manage. Some local government owners are able to diligently maintain surplus land; others
lack the necessary resources.80 Various policies and processes for
selling public property can be confusing, complex, and contradictory.81 Basic property data—such as which government owns a
given parcel—can be faulty or nonexistent.82 Disparate management approaches yield disparate enforcement schemes, which in
turn threaten to create confusing and potentially inconsistent
77. See Aurelia Chaudhury, Adam J. Levitin & David Schleicher, Junk Cities: Resolving
Insolvency Crises in Overlapping Municipalities, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 465 (2019) (discussing the existence and forecast of fiscal crises among local government entities).
78. See Zale, supra note 32, at 305. But see Gerald E. Frug, Property and Power: Hartog
on the Legal History of New York City, 1984 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 673 (1984) (book review) (discussing New York City’s early success selling public property, which served as an
important source of city revenue in eighteenth century New York).
79. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 39, at 576 (examining the relationship between institutional redundancies and fiscal stability in local government).
80. See 2017 Vacant Property Maintenance Plan, GENESEE CNTY. LAND BANK 1 (2017),
https://www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/Vacant-Properties-Maintenance-Plan-2017
.pdf [https://perma.cc/886F-Y3NQ] (indicating that mowing grass and removing debris from
its vacant land would cost the Land Bank $7 million annually; because its maintenance
budget is only $1.5 million, the Land Bank implements different policies on different properties, for instance by performing more maintenance work on parcels located next to occupied private properties).
81. Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana Land Reform in the Storms’ Aftermath, 53 LOY. L.
REV. 727, 734 (2007) (regarding New Orleans); Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 218 (regarding Philadelphia); Salsich et al., supra note 52, at 64 (regarding St. Louis).
82. Anderson, supra note 66, at 1172. Similar data issues exist at the federal level. See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY: NATIONAL STRATEGY AND
BETTER DATA NEEDED TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF EXCESS AND UNDERUTILIZED
PROPERTY 1 (June 2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-645.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L82T6Q9].
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obligations for members of the public when entering and using government land.83 While these issues can arise in a nonfragmented
environment where one public entity owns all surplus land, fragmentation adds substantial transaction costs when considering a
parcel’s management and sale. A concerned neighbor or interested
buyer must navigate multiple and potentially conflicting spheres
of governmental bureaucracy to get their questions addressed or to
pursue purchasing a parcel.84
Crucially, this overlapping and indeterminate bureaucracy aggravates the cost of public land fragmentation by extending it beyond the realm of government administration and into the domain
of community rights. Property deemed vacant or surplus by a public owner often serves a communal function as the site of gardens,
informal parks, or social gatherings.85 Commentators have explored how these functions—community gardens in particular—
represent a form of urban commons where residents of marginalized neighborhoods can build social capital and reclaim and renew
spaces scarred by racial legacies.86 Through customary use and collective stewardship, residents cultivating a community garden acquire a right to access the space, which some scholars maintain
should be considered inherently public in nature.87 Yet the underlying governmental titleholder still plays an outsized and often decisive administrative role. Community gardens form and operate
against the backdrop of local government regulation,88 and their
ability to survive, garner political support, and advocate for formal
83. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, The Evolution of Federal Public Land and Resource Law
in the 21st Century, NO. 1 RMMLF-INST 1, 1–27 (2017) (discussing concurrent jurisdiction
and preemption where states enforce environmental regulations on interspersed public
land).
84. See id.; Alexander, supra note 81, at 734.
85. See Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 201–05 (critiquing the concept of “surplus” and
“vacant” land).
86. See id. (positioning community gardens in the context of racial injustice and justice);
Nate Ela, Urban Commons as Property Experiment: Mapping Chicago’s Farms and Gardens, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 252–53 (2016) (summarizing the literature); see also Jane
E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local Policies
Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 354–57 (2000) (surveying the benefits of community gardens); Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban
Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 93–96 (2011).
87. Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 196 (discussing the “right to not be excluded”); id.
at 199–200 (regarding stewardship); Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 574 (2006) (arguing for community gardens as “inherently public” property).
88. See, e.g., Ela, supra note 86, at 269.
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recognition is complicated by some of the same issues that characterize public land fragmentation writ large—namely the lack of
data, a constellation of disparate policies, and the challenge of utilizing fragmented parcels.89
Consolidating public land under one owner helps to address the
problem by reducing the number of governmental actors the community must monitor in order to protect its interests.90 Where public land is fragmented, conversely, governmental decisions are
splintered and obscured between different entities and elected officials, allowing regulatory changes or parcel sales to proceed without the community’s knowledge.91 A community garden that covers
multiple parcels of public land risks an existential threat when one
of its component parcels is sold.92 Fragmentation thus has an inequitable impact on local power: while residents with informal property claims are marginalized at the whim of heterogeneous governance decisions, residents with significant formal property claims—
i.e., large private landowners—enjoy an increased ability to affect
those decisions and wield influence over local development and important land use decisions. Because fractured public land boosts
the development value of consolidated private property, powerful
private owners hold an outsized ability to dictate the nature and
location of development projects in a checkerboarded city.93 These
private owners gain direct access to the cogs of local government.94
89. See generally Schukoske, supra note 86, at 365 (comparing various cities’ garden lot
leasing policies); Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 219, 239–40 (discussing policy differentiations in and regulatory hurdles to land use in New York).
90. See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 626 (2017)
(“As proverbially hard as it is to ‘fight city hall,’ it is that much more challenging to contend
with dozens of local agencies.”); see also Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 220 (describing the
mobilization of community gardeners against unified draft policies in Philadelphia designed
to replace policies previously scattered and fractured between agencies).
91. See Heller, supra note 58, at 1196 (discussing the “decisionmaking [sic] breakdown”
that may occur with fragmented commons property); Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 213.
Cahn and Segal provide a compelling account of data deficiencies and stakeholder marginalization where public entities own community garden parcels. Id. at 216–27.
92. See Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 240–41.
93. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Needing and Fearing Billionaires in Cities Abandoned by Wealth, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2016); see also Foster, supra note 87, 548
(discussing the inequitable impact of fragmented land use decisions). Detroit is a glaring
example of a city with vast public land holdings that are nevertheless often too fragmented
for productive development. See Henry Holland, Note, Confronting the Land-Shortage Problem in Detroit: A Proposal for Land Readjustment, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 841, 842 (2019); see
also infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text (discussing land assembly for a Fiat Chrysler factory in Detroit).
94. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
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Other residents, however, especially historically marginalized
groups not versed in the workings of the bureaucracy, must jump
from one government office to the next in search of basic property
information.95
Fragmented power also enters the relationship between governmental owners. Under the theoretical view of a fragmented anticommons, although collective action requires the consent of every
owner and can be stymied by the veto of one, bargaining can overcome this risk in an optimal market by offering holdouts sufficient
financial incentives.96 Yet fragmentation between governmental
owners does not adhere to optimal market conditions. Rather than
being compelled by economic factors, a governmental entity may
be more motivated by political rivalries and administrative infighting.97 A public owner can exercise its veto merely through delay and inertia.98 At the same time, because public entities are not
monolithic bodies, but rather may be responsive to a diverse coalition of constituents and elected officials, collective action is all the
more difficult when government owns the fragmented land: it requires all stakeholders to be on the same page. More likely is the
route of least resistance, whereby path dependency dictates that
underutilized fragmented land remains uneasily in that status
quo.99
In sum, as much as property fragmentation poses costs and inefficiencies as a matter of theory, it takes a singular toll where land
is splintered between multiple public owners. Whether the public
entity is seeking to sell, develop, or merely manage the property,
fragmentation exacerbates certain issues inherent to public land
ownership: it deepens the fault lines and inequities of local power,
brings data deficiencies to the fore, and ultimately breeds a gridlock environment poised for continued inertia and inaction. All the
while, in many contexts, the land remains unproductive—
95. Interview with Collin Roach, Wayne Cnty. Land Bank Prop. Disposition Manager
(Jan. 19, 2021) (notes on file with author).
96. See Kelly, supra note 69, at 572–73; Heller, supra note 69, at 673–74.
97. See Eidelman, supra note 15, at 715–16; see also John Travis Marshall, Rating the
Cities: Constructing a City Resilience Index for Assessing the Effect of State and Local Laws
on Long-Term Recovery from Crisis and Disaster, 90 TUL. L. REV. 35, 37–38 (2015) (discussing New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
98. Eidelman, supra note 15, at 715 (discussing “institutional and intergovernmental
inertia”).
99. See id. at 702–03 (discussing path dependency in the context of fragmented public
property).
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siphoning revenue from local taxing jurisdictions and depressing
property values nearby.100
III. ASSESSING REMEDIES TO INTERLOCAL LAND FRAGMENTATION
Having explored the genus and scope of the issue, this Article
now turns to its core prescriptive question: what can be done to
remedy the fragmentation of surplus public land between local governmental owners? When underutilized land is fragmented between private parties, or between private and public owners, a
number of legal mechanisms can be employed to promote consolidation of the properties. At the most aggressive level, local authorities can acquire a property via eminent domain to bring it under
unified public ownership, or alternatively can pursue code enforcement or nuisance abatement actions to obtain title if the current
owner does not take necessary remediation steps.101 At the more
passive level, the tax foreclosure process can serve as a default vehicle for land consolidation; if and when the current owner fails to
pay property taxes, the property may end up in the ownership of a
local government entity, often the general purpose municipality.102
But these tools for land consolidation are generally unavailable
when property is fragmented between multiple public owners.
While at times public owners can be subject to eminent domain,
code enforcement, or tax foreclosure, such efforts are liable to raise
legal questions and pose thorny political hurdles.103 Reducing
100. See Kelly, supra note 69, at 578 (“Derelict, vacant houses can have tremendous negative impacts on the surrounding neighborhood.”); Kelly, supra note 42, at 114. A number
of empirical studies have examined the impact of vacancy and blight on surrounding properties in a neighborhood. For a compilation of these such studies, see DYNAMO METRICS,
QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF LAND BANK ACTIVITY IN MICHIGAN
11–19 (May 15, 2018), https://www.dynamometrics.com/s/DynamoMetrics_MALB_Digital.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PS9D-6UZB].
101. See Heller & Hills, supra note 70, at 1467 (noting that eminent domain is used to
condemn inefficiently fragmented land); Kelly, supra note 42, at 110 (discussing code enforcement remedies); Elizabeth M. Tisher, Re-Stitching the Urban Fabric: Municipal-Driven
Rehabilitation of Vacant and Abandoned Buildings in Ohio’s Rust Belt, 15 VT. J. ENV’T L.
173, 204 (2013) (discussing nuisance abatement); see also supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
102. Kelly, supra note 42, at 112, 123 (discussing tax foreclosure as a way to consolidate
fragmented land).
103. See A. S. Klein, Annotation, Power of Eminent Domain as Between State and Subdivision or Agency Thereof, or as Between Different Subdivisions or Agencies Themselves, 35
A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1293 § 2(a) (2020) (discussing and citing examples of the baseline rule that a
local government entity cannot condemn the property of another local government entity
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fragmentation between governmental owners demands an alternative approach.
A. Public Ownership Consolidation
In an optimal universe, the solution to public land fragmentation
would be a straightforward one: by either interlocal agreement or
legislative edict, all surplus property would be identified and consolidated under the ownership of a single entity. Such ownership
consolidation has been broadly promoted as a solution to fragmented public land,104 and on occasion these calls are heeded. In
Philadelphia, for example, public property is severely fragmented
between local governmental entities, including the Philadelphia
Land Bank, the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation,
and the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority.105 Following sustained criticism of the city’s inefficient and disjointed bureaucracy
for selling surplus land, the Philadelphia City Council passed a bill
in late 2019 to streamline this process and make the Land Bank
the central agency for managing and repurposing public property.106 The impact of Philadelphia’s recent efforts remains to be
absent express legislative authority). Detroit provides an example of the possible legal and
political impediments of intergovernmental code enforcement. While the city’s code enforcement authority does not appear restricted to private parties, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 117.4q
(2021), the city in practice appears to only pursue actions against private parties, and not
against the Detroit Land Bank, see Katlyn Alo, Detroit Land Bank Oversight at Issue as
Neighbors Complain of Poor Upkeep, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/02/13/detroit-land-bank-oversight-issue-amidcomplaints-poor-upkeep/4592183002/ [https://perma.cc/86TH-XKH5] (quoting a city official
saying that “[w]e would love to have a lot of this land in private hands being managed privately, so we can just do code enforcement”).
104. See, e.g., BUREAU OF GOV’T RSCH., MENDING THE URBAN FABRIC: BLIGHT IN NEW
ORLEANS; PROCEDURES FOR SUCCESSFUL REDEVELOPMENT 15–16 (Apr. 2008), https://
www.bgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BGR_blight_report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/G39L
-F8QF].
105. An examination of Philadelphia parcel data indicates block-by-block ownership
fragmentation in a manner that mirrors East Garfield Park in Chicago. See Property App,
CITY OF PHILA., https://property-beta.phila.gov/#/ [https://perma.cc/7TSM-WS9H]; see also
supra notes 9–11 (providing examples of fragmentation in East Garfield Park). As of 2019,
the Philadelphia Land Bank estimated that there were about 8,420 vacant public properties
in the city, with about half owned by the city through its Department of Public Property and
about one-third owned by the Land Bank. See Jon Hurdle, Plot Twist: Land Bank Seeks to
Repurpose Vacant Properties, But Critics Say Progress is Slow, PHILA. WKLY. (June 27,
2019), https://philadelphiaweekly.com/plot-twist-land-bank-seeks-to-repurpose-vacant-pro
perties-but-critics-say-progress-is-slow/ [https://perma.cc/V4PS-UBBJ].
106. See Hurdle, supra note 105; Cahn & Segal, supra note 30, at 218–19 (discussing the
splintered public ownership landscape in Philadelphia as of 2015). Regarding the reform
measures passed in late 2019, see Michael D’Onofrio, City Council Reforms Process for
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seen. In many instances, it appears that the title to surplus properties will remain fragmented even as management and disposal
processes are consolidated; calls continue for the full title consolidation of land ownership in one single entity.107
Regardless of the ultimate outcome, Philadelphia’s experience
underscores the rarity of these consolidation efforts. In Philadelphia, the move towards reform required a measure of political will
among elected officials, which arose only after frustration with patronage in the city’s disposition practices boiled into the public
sphere.108 It also required the City Council to hold a measure of
authority over the Land Bank and Redevelopment Authority, making it possible to prescribe transformative policy and ownership
changes that all three entities would adopt.109 More likely these
factors do not align. Absent charges of corruption or patronage, local land fragmentation is generally not a visible public issue, let
alone a prominent one.110 In addition, where autonomous government entities are involved, a measure to consolidate ownership
would require one entity to voluntarily cede its properties—and

Selling City Land, Sends Bill to Kenney, PHILA. TRIB. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_news/city-council-reforms-process-for-selling-city-land-sends-bill-to-ke
nney/article_b6969694-21c6-5f5c-83b1-2892e8fd509f.html [https://perma.cc/7E9B-2HFW];
Matthew Rothstein, Philadelphia Housing Development Corp. Absorbs Redevelopment Authority, Land Bank in Department Merger, BISNOW E. COAST (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.
bisnow.com/philadelphia/news/economic-development/philadelphia-housing-developmentcorp-redevelopment-authority-land-bank-department-merger-101254 [https://perma.cc/UW
Q4-VD9C]; Laura McCrystal, Can Philly Fix its Slow and Complex Process for Vacant Land
Sales? A Reform Bill Advances in City Council., PHILA. INQ. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.in
quirer.com/news/philadelphia-vacantproperty-land-bank-city-council-development-peroga
tive-20191001.html [https://perma.cc/PNW4-TJXT].
107. See City Council Passes Reform to Vacant Land Sale Process, COMM. OF SEVENTY
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://seventy.org/media/press-releases/2019/10/31/city-council-passes-re
form-to-vacant-land-sale-process [https://perma.cc/D66E-9JRQ] (calling for a complete
transfer of surplus property to the Philadelphia Land Bank). Efforts to consolidate ownership in the Land Bank have been ongoing since shortly after the Land Bank was established
in 2014. See City Council Moves to Transfer Properties to Philadelphia Land Bank, PHILA.
CITY COUNCIL (Dec. 3, 2015), https://phlcouncil.com/city-council-moves-to-transfer-proper
ties-to-philadelphia-land-bank/ [https://perma.cc/74ZR-XDNH].
108. Much of the public outcry centered around the Vacant Property Review Committee,
which was exposed as a mechanism of patronage in public land dealings. See Matthew Rothstein, A New City Land Policy Could Unlock Affordable, Workforce Housing Development in
Philly, BISNOW E. COAST (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.bisnow.com/philadelphia/news/af
fordable-housing/affordable-workforce-housing-new-land-disposition-processing-105928
[https://perma.cc/V6H4-SNQJ].
109. Id.
110. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting public land fragmentation as a
below-the-radar issue).
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thereby, ostensibly, a degree of power as well—to the other.111 Local governments are not always amicable partners. Rather, they
are liable to compete with each other and engage in turf wars to
protect real or perceived spheres of power.112 A move to consolidate
public land ownership can be quickly derailed if one entity simply
does not want to relinquish the properties it owns, or, similarly,
does not see a political value in doing so.
Detroit offers a stark case of fragmentation at the expense of
consolidation, where two land bank authorities—the Detroit Land
Bank and Wayne County Land Bank—both own residential property, in some places interspersed on the same city block.113 Because
no single governmental entity controls both land banks, consolidation would require either one land bank to voluntarily relinquish
its properties or for the Michigan Legislature to take legislative
action. The first route is unlikely, considering that public agencies
are motivated by self-preservation and managing public property
is the core purpose of each land bank.114 The second route is also
unlikely. When legislation to merge the two entities was introduced in 2010, it faced opposition from the land banks and their
stakeholders and ultimately did not pass.115
Detroit’s experience highlights the challenge of using land banks
as a general tool for consolidation. Despite being promoted as a
111. Perhaps the most common example is fragmentation between a municipality and
county. See supra notes 18–19 (providing examples from Birmingham, Miami, and San Diego). Cities and counties do not hold formal power regarding the land ownership decisions
of the other, and indeed often compete for development and tax revenues. See Judith Welch
Wegner, North Carolina’s Annexation Wars: Whys, Wherefores, and What Next, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 165, 184−85 (2012); Patricia E. Salkin, Supersizing Small Town America: Using Regionalism to Right-Size Big Box Retail, 6 VT. J. ENV’T L. 48, 55−57 (2005).
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
113. For example, the Detroit Land Bank owns 5205 Garland Street. See Own It Now
Property Details: 5205 Garland, DET. LAND BANK AUTH., https://buildingdetroit.org/proper
ties/5205-garland [https://perma.cc/H567-PYT9]. The Wayne County Land Bank owns 5138
Garland, less than half a block to the south. See Quit Claim Deed 2018064231, WAYNE CNTY.
REG. OF DEEDS, https://waynecountymi-web.tylerhost.net/web/document/DOC572S3116?se
arch=DOCSEARCH582S1 [https://perma.cc/Q8UW-4UMJ].
114. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 124.752 (2021) (finding the purpose of a land bank “to
acquire, assemble, dispose of, and quiet title to property”); Joy Milligan, Plessy Preserved:
Agencies and the Effective Constitution, 129 YALE L.J. 924, 936 n.43 (2020) (“Administrators’
self-interest in the continuance of their agencies and programs is widely recognized as a
source of bureaucratic motivation.”).
115. Nancy Kaffer & Amy Lane, Wayne County Land Banks Cool to Merger Proposal,
CRAIN’S DET. BUS. (Feb. 7, 2010), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20100207/SUB01/
302079967/detroit-wayne-county-land-banks-cool-to-merger-proposal [https://perma.cc/3Y9
6-DJB9].
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vehicle for consolidating and managing surplus parcels,116 land
banks often themselves become participants in fractured governance.117 In part, public fragmentation persists because land banks
are fundamentally designed as intermediate titleholders for distressed private property.118 The overriding goal of land banking—
and a core feature of a land bank’s powers and funding scheme—is
the disposition of delinquent or tax-foreclosed property to private
owners capable of returning the land to productive use.119 This
framework encourages land banks to focus on near-term disposition programs and economic development projects.120 It emphasizes, and is designed for, returning property piecemeal to the private domain rather than consolidating surplus public land.
This is not to say that land banks cannot serve as loci for land
assembly.121 But in practice, outside of targeted development projects and notwithstanding permissive land bank acquisition powers,122 local entities often hesitate to endorse title consolidation

116. Amy Laura Cahn, On Retiring Blight as Policy and Making Eastwick Whole, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 490 (2014).
117. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the Genesee County Land
Bank in Flint, Michigan); Benton C. Martin, Federalism and Municipal Innovation: Lessons
from the Fight Against Vacant Properties, 46 URB. LAW. 361, 371 (2014) (discussing the role
of land banks in building constituencies in a crowded governance space).
118. See Marissa Weiss, Attack of the Zombie Properties, 47 URB. LAW. 485, 497 (2015)
(“It is clear that while land banks may be a great short-term solution, their high cost of
operation precludes them from becoming a sustainable solution to the [abandoned property]
problem.”); see also Zale, supra note 32, at 298; Shelley Cavalieri, Linchpin Approaches to
Salvaging Neighborhoods in the Legacy Cities of the Midwest, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 483
(2017) (“Where property can be rehabilitated, land banks are integrally involved in transferring the land to private owners to do this work, or at times will complete the rehabilitation and sell the improved property. Where abandonment and blight have left the property
unfixable, land banks will facilitate demolition, and typically transfer the vacant lot to a
private owner to maintain.”). A defining feature of land bank power is the ability to clear
title, which directly furthers these disposition goals. See id. at 482−83. Regarding funding,
see also Tisher, supra note 101, at 199−200 (discussing how land banks favor a strategy of
demolition and development, spurred by the availability of demolition funds).
119. Ron Johnson, Comment, Putting the Heart Back in the Heartland: Regional Land
Bank Initiatives for Sustainable Rural Economies, 69 ARK. L. REV. 1055, 1093 (2017) (“[T]he
central focus of land bank operations is to effectively dispose of property for positive, productive future use.”).
120. See, e.g., Cavalieri, supra note 118, at 483 n.37 (discussing side lot programs).
121. See Zale, supra note 32, at 297–98, 298 n.124 (citing Philadelphia as an example of
land assembly efforts through a land bank’s ownership).
122. See, e.g., CNTY. COMM’RS ASS’N OF OHIO, COUNTY LAND REUTILIZATION
CORPORATIONS: LAND BANKS 3–4 (July 2015), https://www.ccao.org/wp-content/uploads/
HBKCHAP081%207-16-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A78-7S6A] (surveying the broad acquisition power of land banks in Ohio); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 124.755 (2021) (granting broad acquisition powers in Michigan).
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under a land bank’s ownership.123 Property consolidation under
land bank auspices is ultimately challenging for many of the same
reasons why it is difficult to consolidate public entities themselves:
political calculus tends to err against it.124
B. Interlocal Agreements
Short of ownership consolidation, another solution to address
fragmented public property could be the use of interlocal or intergovernmental agreements to create shared management
schemes.125 In theory, interlocal agreements could ameliorate
many of the adverse effects of fragmented land: by agreeing to
share management of their public parcels, or more likely to assign
management duties to a single entity, a group of two or more local
governments could standardize administrative practices, data collection, and disposition policies across their surplus lands.126
Yet interlocal agreements can quickly run into legal and political
challenges. Broadly speaking, local governments often hold statutory or constitutional authority to enter into interlocal agreements,
so long as the agreement provides for the exercise of functions that
each entity is authorized to perform independently.127 In some
123. In both Ohio and Michigan, general purpose local governments are empowered to
take title to certain vacant or tax-foreclosed property before it goes to a land bank. See CNTY.
COMM’RS ASS’N OF OHIO, supra note 122, at 4 (regarding Ohio law); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 211.78m(6) (2021) (regarding Michigan law). Governments routinely take advantage of
these opportunities, especially in upper-income areas, because they want control over public
land decisions in their jurisdiction. Interview with Collin Roach, supra note 95.
124. See supra section I.B.
125. Intergovernmental agreements regarding land have a long history in American law.
See Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326, 2348 (2020). In a similar
vein, interlocal agreements have been proposed as a solution for governmental fragmentation and way to promote regionalism. See Craig R. Bucki, Regionalism Revisited: The Effort
to Streamline Governance in Buffalo and Erie County, New York, 71 ALB. L. REV. 117, 125
(2008); David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan
Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 736 (2003) (book review). But see Matthew J. Parlow,
Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 75 (2012) (“However, studies show that
municipalities do not enter into [interlocal] agreements without inducements and without
measurable gains for their community.”). Intergovernmental agreements have been described as a form of “functional consolidation.” Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 187, 228 (2018).
126. See supra Part II (examining problems caused by fragmented property). Interlocal
agreements to transfer surplus public property, the focus of this Article, should be distinguished from interlocal agreements to transfer jurisdiction over an area of land—whether
that land is publicly or privately owned—between local public entities. See, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 124.22 (2021).
127. See Richard G. Flood & Molly D. Velick, Questions and Answers About
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states, this authority likely encompasses the more specific power
to contract for land management purposes.128 In other states, however, the permitted reasons for entering into an interlocal agreement are more circumscribed, and it is equally likely that an agreement to transfer land management functions would not pass
judicial muster.129
After these legal hurdles are surmounted, interlocal agreements
may be stymied by policymakers who are hesitant to relinquish
power over the property they control. Unlike with consolidation,
where one government would transfer its properties to another, an
interlocal agreement could well prompt concerns among both parties to the transaction: both may fear that shared governance reduces their autonomous power, even if the language of the agreement indicates otherwise. Such concerns can quickly derail a deal
because interlocal agreements typically require an affirmative vote
of each governing body.130 Where an agreement proposes to share
power immediately but promises benefits that are realized only in
the long term, it can be challenging to gain the support of all necessary political stakeholders, who tend to operate on shorter-term
horizons and in search of policies that offer short-term benefits.131
For this reason, interlocal agreements to provide or share services—which promise concrete and immediate efficiencies and cost
savings—are relatively common, while agreements regarding land

Intergovernmental Agreements, 85 ILL. B.J. 112, 114 (1997) (discussing Illinois law); George
J. Cerrone, Jr., The IGA: A Smart Approach for Local Governments, 29 COLO. LAW. 73, 73
(2000) (discussing Colorado law). Another standard limitation is that municipalities cannot
contract away their police powers. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?:
Sharing the Benefits and Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV.
659, 673 (1997).
128. See Flood & Velick, supra note 127, at 114 (discussing Illinois cases; even so, some
land management agreements were found invalid for constituting ultra vires leases under
Illinois law).
129. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. DeKalb Cty., 713 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ga. 2011) (internal
citation omitted) (striking down an interlocal agreement for failing to comply with GA.
CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. I, which requires an agreement to involve “the provision of services,
or . . . the joint or separate use of facilities or equipment and deal with activities, services,
or facilities which the contracting parties are authorized by law to undertake or provide” if
it extends beyond the current government’s term in office).
130. Kellen Zale, Part-Time Government, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 987, 1032 (2019).
131. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
190, 252 (2001); Briffault, supra note 48, at 1122; Keith Aoki, All the King’s Horses and All
the King’s Men: Hurdles to Putting the Fragmented Metropolis Back Together Again?
Statewide Land Use Planning, Portland Metro and Oregon’s Measure 37, 21 J.L. & POL. 397,
418 (2005).
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use and management are rare.132 Surplus land management is particularly vulnerable to government inertia because the payoffs it
affords are more attenuated and indirect.133
Once implemented, there is no doubt interlocal agreements can
play a positive role in local governance. They can harmonize practices between public bodies while fostering collaboration and coordination, thereby promoting civic values while also acting as bulwarks against regional competition.134 This serves an important
signaling function. It indicates to the public, to other governmental
entities, and to the signatory governments themselves that the
purposes of the agreement reflect shared institutional priorities.
But the collaboration inherent in an interlocal agreement can also
stymie its long-term effectiveness. To make them palatable to
stakeholders, interlocal agreements are often implemented without substantive dispute resolution mechanisms, which makes
them difficult to monitor and enforce.135 More than simply a value
promoted by interlocal agreements, collaboration might also be the
only mechanism for ensuring they actually operate as intended.
In the case of public land fragmentation, therefore, interlocal
agreements may create only illusory value. Two governmental entities may agree to align management and disposition practices,
but new development opportunities, shifting fiscal realities, and
changed political circumstances all threaten to erode the agreement over time.
C. Land Exchanges
Land exchanges offer a third way forward. As compared with
property consolidation and interlocal agreements, the exchange of
property between two entities does not demand the same measure
of political will. It need not threaten a public body’s autonomy, but
rather can resemble a like-for-like transaction: one government
provides surplus property to the other, which in return transfers
132. See Saxer, supra note 127, at 672–73; Briffault, supra note 48, at 1147. But see
James W. Spensley, Using Intergovernmental Agreements to Manage Growth, 15 NAT. RES.
& ENV’T 240, 242 (2001) (discussing the use of interlocal agreements as a land use planning
tool to manage regional growth).
133. See Eidelman, supra note 15, at 702–03, 715 (discussing governmental inertia and
path dependency in the face of public land fragmentation).
134. Spensley, supra note 132, at 277.
135. Id.; Gillette, supra note 131, at 257; Briffault, supra note 48, at 1155.
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surplus land of similar size or value. Both entities can walk away
from the transaction reassured that their ultimate authority has
not been compromised.
In the process, meanwhile, land fragmentation can be meaningfully reduced by an exchange. Where two governments own fragmented land and an interlocal agreement or full-borne ownership
consolidation is being proposed, the aim of reducing fragmentation
may not override looming political and governance concerns.136 But
where a like-for-like land exchange is being considered, reducing
fragmentation may suddenly become an appealing aim for both
public owners. Both owners can potentially realize increased value
and reduced carrying costs by accounting for fragmentation in
their exchange.137 Both can thus view the exchange as a win-win
opportunity as a direct consequence of its ability to ameliorate local
fragmentation. Stated otherwise, where an exchange is proposed,
the issue of fragmented land shifts appreciably from a marginal,
under-the-radar concern to a central motivating goal.138
Examples at the local level demonstrate how a successful exchange of surplus property goes hand-in-hand with efforts to reduce fragmented public land. In 2014, two local governments in
southern Indiana—Monroe County and the City of Bloomington—
proposed a mutual land swap of surplus public property: the City
would receive a nearly two mile stretch of abandoned railbed from
the County in exchange for approximately 2.5 miles of similarly
abandoned railbed located further south.139 While the parties did
not describe their proposal in these terms, reducing fragmented
landholdings was a prime motivating factor behind their effort.
The stretch of property eyed by the City lay between two existing
City-owned trails, the B-Line Trail and Clear Creek Trail, and

136. See supra sections III.A, III.B (discussing the implementation challenges posed by
these approaches).
137. See supra Part II.
138. Federal legislation providing for the exchange of land frequently notes that the exchange will serve the interest of reducing land fragmentation. See, e.g., Minnesota Education Investment and Employment Act, H.R. 5544, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 1309, 105th
Cong. (1998) (noting part of its purpose is “[t]o provide for an exchange of lands with the
city of Greeley, Colorado, and The Water Supply and Storage Company to eliminate private
inholdings in wilderness areas.”).
139. Rachel Bunn, Bloomington-Monroe County Land Swap Could Allow Expansion of
Trails, HERALD TIMES (May 22, 2014, 12:28 AM), https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald
_times_online/news/local/bloomington-monroe-county-land-swap-could-allow-expansion-oftrails/article_b8f2ff2a-98b2-5438-9574-cf22e0a59143.html [https://perma.cc/837V-J5ZZ].
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parallel to another one.140 Acquiring this interspersed land offered
the City an opportunity to better integrate its trail system. Meanwhile, the stretch of property sought by the County intersected a
forty-one-acre parcel owned by the Indiana Department of Transportation, which was conducting a mitigation project on the site
but had discussed transferring the parcel to the County afterwards.141 The land exchange offered the County an opportunity to
fashion integrated recreational amenities as well.
Both parties’ goals for the exchange ultimately came to fruition.
The exchange was successfully implemented, the City and County
began construction on the properties they obtained from each
other, and plans moved forward to transfer the forty-one-acre parcel to the County for a future park.142 In effect, the result turned
vacant surplus land into a win-win outcome for both entities because it promoted consolidation by its very nature, but did so without requiring overarching legislative action or threatening the political autonomy of either government body.
Bloomington’s example further underscores the lasting benefits
of a land exchange. As compared to interlocal agreements, which
may prove unenforceable and subject to changing political winds,
an exchange of property effectuates a complete transfer of title.
Once complete, the exchange has long-term ramifications for land
management, even as political leaders and priorities come and go.
Whether an exchanged parcel of land is destined to be publicly
owned for months or for generations, it will be easier on balance to
maintain and administer, no matter how long the interim period
lasts143—as well as more likely to get developed or repurposed and
returned to productivity.144
In Bloomington, the County and City were able to realize their
ultimate development goals for the surplus rail properties within
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.; Ernest Rollins, County Begins Work on Limestone Greenway Trail, THE HERALD
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.heraldtimesonline.com/story/news/local/2019
/03/13/county-begins-work-on-limestone-greenway-trail/46931203/ [https://perma.cc/9H9CS6G6]; Geoff McKim, Update on County Trail Projects, IN53—MOCOGOV (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://in53.wpcomstaging.com/2018/02/16/update-on-county-trail-projects/ [https://perma.
cc/CAT6-FEMN].
143. See supra Part II (discussing the challenges of administering and maintaining fragmented land).
144. See supra Part II (discussing the challenges of developing fragmented land).
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just a few years of completing the exchange. But even if funding
sources had not materialized and development of the properties did
not proceed for some time, it is still likely that the entities would
have benefitted from their exchange in the interim by reducing
maintenance inefficiencies, strengthening the viability of their envisioned projects when seeking grant funds, and offering less fractured ownership data for purposes of surrounding development
and utility work. And perhaps, in the same manner as extolled by
proponents of interlocal agreements, the exchange would have advanced intergovernmental working relations even if the trails had
not come to fruition.145
Land exchanges are therefore deceptively simple. They need not
alter local power dynamics, force the consolidation of any local entities, entail any specific development plans, or involve the outlay
of any money. Even so, in part as a virtue of their simplicity, exchanges offer a way to squarely tackle the ills of fragmentation
while reducing inefficiencies and transaction costs, both with respect to the properties themselves and between the two participating governments more generally.
D. Assembled Land Exchanges
While swapping surplus rail parcels yielded positive outcomes
for both the City of Bloomington and Monroe County, the exchange
was a one-off transaction, motivated by contextual factors and not
replicated between these parties on a wider scale. Bloomington’s
land exchange took advantage of a bilateral geographic opportunity: the County owned property that could be seamlessly consolidated under City ownership while the City likewise held property that stood to complement adjacent County land. Not all
checkered public land lends itself to a bilateral exchange. Rather,
in many regions or neighborhoods, public land is scattered and disjointed, reflecting more a splatter painting than a jigsaw puzzle.146
Simple bilateral land exchanges can still occur in these contexts
and can still advance the normative aims of consolidation. But a
more dynamic and adaptive model is also needed.

145. See Bunn, supra note 139 (quoting a City of Bloomington official stating that “it’s a
good thing when city and county agencies can collaborate like this”).
146. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the Settegast neighborhood in Houston).
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Multiparty land exchanges—which, drawing upon federal law,
this Article terms “assembled exchanges”147—provide a way to replicate Bloomington’s example on a wider scale. Under an assembled exchange, all public owners in a given county, city, or neighborhood would agree to pool and then redistribute their surplus
properties in a manner that promotes geographic consolidation and
best management practices. For example, in a neighborhood where
three public entities own property—a city, a land bank, and a park
district—an assembled exchange could consolidate surplus land on
one block under the park district’s ownership, for purposes of creating new greenspace; surplus land on another block under city
ownership, for purposes of a development project; and the remaining pooled parcels under land bank ownership for purposes of clearing title and transferring lots to neighborhood residents. The assembled exchange would be structured as a series of cascading
bilateral transactions between the parties. As such, its redistribution of land would not be constricted by a given property’s original
owner.148
An assembled exchange therefore expands the reach of a conventional exchange: it broadens the number of parties and properties
that can be involved while building temporal flexibility into the
process. Creating a pool of eligible exchange properties is the key
action needed to kick-start an intergovernmental conversation.
While placing a property into this pool would not obligate a public
owner to consummate an exchange, it would establish a starting
point for negotiations that could yield subsequent transactions
over a period of months or years.
To be sure, an assembled exchange by its nature involves a number of moving parts and generates its own transaction costs. Yet
unlike the transaction costs created by fragmentation,149 these
costs would arguably promote important property and governance

147. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
148. To an extent, the process would mirror land readjustment, which is an approach
used in Germany, Australia, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Russia to assemble and then redistribute urbanizing private land. See Heller, supra note 69, at 641 n.103; see also Lee Anne
Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1490 (2016). As a key distinction,
however, a fundamental principle of land readjustment is the replatting of property following assembly, often as part of an effort to construct infrastructure improvements. This process implicates legal questions different from assembled exchanges, which do not redraw
parcel boundaries. See Henry Holland, Confronting the Land-Shortage Problem in Detroit:
A Proposal for Land Readjustment, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 841, 845 (2019).
149. See supra Part II.
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values. The process of assembling and dividing a common resource
requires collaboration.150 In pursuit of an assembled exchange,
governments would not need to cede their autonomy but would
need to work together—when identifying a pool of properties, when
thinking collectively about shared land management issues, and
when structuring conveyances—a form of governance that increases stakeholder engagement and mitigates against adversarial
policymaking.151
The process could also amplify the voice of community residents.
While a simple parcel-for-parcel exchange might fly below the public radar, the creation of an intergovernmental property pool would
expand the geographic scope of the conversation and provide a single entry point for public participation, making the pool itself the
situs of the negotiation and decision making that had previously
been fractured across its component parcels.152 This reordering offers a new definition of surplus property: rather than a hodgepodge
assortment of discrete parcels (to be developed piecemeal), an assembled exchange views them universally, as a commons institution to be governed interactively.153 Stated similarly, the process of
assembly and redistribution can help stakeholders reconceptualize
public land from a rigid and atomized form of property, grounded
in exclusion, to an adaptive form grounded in values of sharing and
access.154
A successful assembled exchange ultimately promotes efficiency,
as was realized following the bilateral exchange in Bloomington—
but now with a potentially more expansive reach.155 As in

150. LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN LAW AND
LIFE 5 (2019).
151. Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 281, 329 (2016).
152. In the context of land assembly and eminent domain, a similar concept is advanced
in Heller & Hills, supra note 70, at 1491 (advocating for “land assembly districts,” where
residents of a neighborhood targeted for redevelopment have a collective voice in the process, as contrasted with the uneven and unfair outcomes that result from fractured participation in private land assembly or in eminent domain proceedings).
153. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 151, at 329–32 (regarding collaborative governance
of commons institutions).
154. See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 159,
170, 176 (2017) (advocating for “access” and “share” as alternative property forms, arising
in a variety of contexts where people exchange resources); see also FENNELL, supra note 150,
at 5 (advocating for property as a dynamic institution).
155. See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 154, at 198 (discussing how access and share promote
efficient use of a resource); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
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Bloomington, a successful assembled exchange reconfigures scattered property that had been accidentally splintered between public owners into consolidated landholdings purposefully owned by
the entity best suited to manage them.156
IV. THE FEDERAL LAND EXCHANGE MODEL
Broader experience supports the value of land exchanges. A
model of systematic land exchanges exists at the federal level,
where the exchange process has been used for decades as an effective mechanism to reduce the fragmentation of public property.
The federal model governs exchanges between the United States
and private landowners; it is not limited to intergovernmental
transactions.157 Nevertheless, the model is worth examining. It
provides support for the ability of exchanges to meaningfully reduce land fragmentation, while at the same time it offers features
that could be adopted to promote the systematic use of exchanges
between local governments.
A. The History of Federal Exchanges
The federal land exchange model is rooted in a history of widespread public land fragmentation in the Western United States. In
the nineteenth century, the federal government viewed the vast
public lands it held in the West as a lucrative source of revenue
and a means of regulating settlement and development.158
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719 (1986) (discussing the role of
government in creating property efficiencies).
156. See supra section III.C; FENNELL, supra note 150, at 5 (positing that assembly and
division can reconfigure a resource); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (regarding the public entity best suited to own a given parcel).
157. See Ryan M. Beaudoin, Federal Ownership and Management of America’s Public
Lands Through Land Exchanges, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 229, 231 (2000). While commonly used and analyzed in the context of public-private transactions, the federal exchange
model does apply as well to exchanges between the federal and state governments. See Susan Culp & Joe Marlow, A Fair Trade: Observations and Recommendations for Improving
the Land Tenure Adjustment Process between State and Federal Agencies in the West,
LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y (2012), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles
/2228_1561_Culp_WP13SC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V573-67SC].
158. Jeffrey Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Congress’s “Power to Dispose of” the
Public Lands, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 453, 470 (2018); see also Amy Stengel, “Insider’s
Game” or Valuable Land Management Tool? Current Issues in the Federal Land Exchange
Program, 14 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 567, 571 (2001) (“In order to encourage citizens to move into
the frontier states of the American West and utilize the vast natural resources of these
lands, the federal government engaged in intensive sale of public lands to individuals.”).
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Congress and a succession of presidential administrations pursued
a land governance policy in the West that promoted the privatization of land ownership at the expense of a long-term retention and
management strategy,159 most famously by disbursing piecemeal
land grants to settlers under the Homestead Act of 1862 and to
railroad companies with the aim of incentivizing rail expansion.160
Between railroad and homestead grants alone, the federal government transferred hundreds of millions of acres into private hands
during the nineteenth century.161 A checkerboard of private and
public ownership soon emerged across the American West.162
By the turn of the twentieth century the federal strategy had
shifted, and the United States began setting aside large tracts of
land for conservation.163 Congress effectively closed the remaining
frontier from disposition by World War II.164 Its modern default
policy of retaining federal land was reflected in the Federal Land
Policy Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), which gave the Bureau of Land Management authority to manage federal property
holdings in the public interest.165

159. Indeed, the long-term strategy was to dispose all or most of the public land, thereby
rendering long-term management strategies irrelevant. See Bill Paul, Statutory Land Exchanges that Reflect “Appropriate” Value and “Well Serve” the Public Interest, 27 PUB. LAND
& RES. L. REV. 107, 110 (2006).
160. George Cameron Coggins, Overcoming the Unfortunate Legacies of Western Public
Land Law, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 381, 382 (1994); Miller, supra note 40, at 209; Culp &
Marlow, supra note 157, at 1.
161. Schmitt, supra note 158, at 496. While the Homestead Act and railroad grants were
the most notable, additional Congressional acts further contributed to fragmentation of public land in the nineteenth century. See Susan Jane M. Brown, David and Goliath: Reformulating the Definition of “The Public Interest” and the Future of Land Swaps After the Interstate 90 Land Exchange, 15 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 235, 240–41 (2000).
162. Beaudoin, supra note 157, at 230 (“The result of the numerous and unconnected
dispositions of property across the United States was a patchwork quilt of federal government ownership.”); see also Paul, supra note 159, at 110; Monson, supra note 41, at 248;
Stengel, supra note 158, at 568.
163. Schmitt, supra note 158, at 497; Miller, supra note 40, at 210; Paul, supra note 159,
at 112. This “shift to retention” thesis reflects the common scholarly opinion, but it has been
criticized as misleading. See Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public
Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative to the “Shift-to-Retention” Thesis, 39 NAT. RES. J.
649, 651 (1999). Under either model, for purposes of this Article, commentators on both
sides of the debate agree that federal property in the West is significantly fragmented in
modern times. See id. at 751 (mentioning as one of several legitimate views “that government title is partial, fraught with caveats and compromises, and riven with legitimate private rights”).
164. Schmitt, supra note 158, at 503.
165. Id. at 504. This default policy has been challenged since the 1970s by proponents of
land transfers from the federal government to the states, a movement originally identified
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The shift towards retention and conservation came too late to
stem the fragmentation caused by the federal government’s nineteenth-century policies. Today, federal property in the Western
United States is severely fragmented and interspersed with state
and private lands.166 Federal administrators can attempt to reduce
this fragmentation through strategic land acquisition.167 Yet where
acquisition dollars are available, often through the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the acquisition process still requires Congressional approval and is subject to pushback at the state level,
where several state governments and advocacy groups in the West
oppose measures to increase federal land ownership.168 Acquisition
funding often is not available or sufficient to meaningfully address
the magnitude of the federal checkerboard.169 Other means of acquiring land—such as eminent domain—carry similar political
hurdles.170
A land exchange avoids these pitfalls. Here, federal agencies can
adhere to their retention mandate by ensuring, on balance, that
the reservoir of public land does not decrease. Exchanges also circumvent the risk of inaccessible funding by bypassing the intermediate steps of receiving, depositing, and drawing upon cash consideration. Driven by these considerations, Congress delegated
express land exchange authority to the executive branch when it
passed the FLPMA in 1976.171

as the Sagebrush Rebellion. See id. at 510–11.
166. See Robert B. Keiter, Biodiversity Conservation and the Intermixed Ownership
Problem: From Nature Reserves to Collaborative Processes, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 301, 307 (2002);
Miller, supra note 40, at 211 (“Today, our federal lands look like paint splatters on a map of
the United States—‘general cartographic chaos’” (quoting Coggins, supra note 160, at 382)).
167. Keiter, supra note 166, at 310.
168. Id. at 310–11. In 2020, the Great American Outdoors Act was signed into law, with
the primary effect of permanently funding the Land and Water Conservation Fund. See
Great American Outdoors Act, ch. 2004, 134 Stat. 686 (2020) (codified as amended at 54
U.S.C. § 200303). This measure may facilitate more federal land acquisition in the future.
Where acquisition funding is available through the Fund, courts have found that the administrative agencies may need to consider acquisition as an alternative to a land exchange.
See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 814–15 (9th Cir. 1999).
169. Miller, supra note 40, at 214; Paul, supra note 159, at 114–15.
170. Paul, supra note 159, at 114–15.
171. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1703. Administrative exchange authority dates back to the Taylor Grazing Act. See id. § 315.
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B. Federal Exchanges Today
The FLPMA sets forth a process by which the two federal agencies primarily tasked with managing public lands—the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)—may consider and
effectuate an administrative exchange.172 Under § 206 of the Act,
the key requirement for approving a land swap is a basic one: a
finding that “the public interest will be well served by making that
exchange.”173 The implementing agency is tasked with considering
a broad range of interests—including economic, recreation, management, development, mineral, and fish and wildlife concerns—
in assessing the public benefit of the lands being acquired versus
those being conveyed.174 Lands being exchanged must be of approximately equal value, although in certain situations an equalization
payment can be made to offset any discrepancies.175 Underpinning
these requirements is a procedural process that involves screening
and prioritizing proposals, conducting environmental reviews in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(“NEPA”), and obtaining property appraisals.176
Federal law permits the BLM to follow this process in pursuing
a conventional bilateral exchange or in pursuing an assembled exchange that involves multiple parties. Under an assembled exchange, “multiple parcels of . . . land[] are consolidated into a package for the purpose of completing one or more exchange
transactions over a period of time.”177 The exchange begins when
the parties enter into an agreement to swap a package of
172. See Miller, supra note 40, at 215. A number of scholars have examined the federal
land exchange process in detail. See, e.g., id. at 211; GIANCARLO PANAGIA, PUBLIC POLICY
AND LAND EXCHANGE: CHOICE, LAW, AND PRAXIS (2015); Beaudoin, supra note 157, at 230–
31; Monson, supra note 41, at 259. Since 1976, several additional statutes have supplemented this regulatory scheme. See Randel Hanson & Giancarlo Panagia, Acts of Bureaucratic Dispossession: The Huckleberry Land Exchange, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, and
Rational(Ized) Forms of Contemporary Appropriation, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 169, 182
(2002); Culp & Marlow, supra note 157, at 5 (discussing the 1988 Federal Land Exchange
Facilitation Act).
173. 43 U.S.C. § 1716; 16 U.S.C. § 516.
174. 43 U.S.C. § 1716; see also Stengel, supra note 158, at 575, 582.
175. 43 U.S.C. § 1716. Modifications in 1988 permitted low-value exchanges in particular
to proceed under the “approximately equal value” standard. See Culp & Marlow, supra note
157, at 5.
176. Miller, supra note 40, at 216; Katharine E. Lovett, Comment, Not All Land Exchanges Are Created Equal: A Case Study of the Oak Flat Land Exchange, 28 COLO. NAT.
RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 353, 361 (2017).
177. 43 C.F.R. § 2201.1-1 (2021); see also id. § 2200.0-5(f).
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properties.178 A ledger account is used to monitor the transfers and
ensure that values of federal lands conveyed and obtained are balanced every three years.179 The assembled exchange ends when a
party terminates the agreement or when all property in the package has been depleted.180 In authorizing a potentially years-long
process that could involve dozens or hundreds of parcels, the statute thus creates a flexible alternative to the standard FLPMA exchange.
By its nature, the BLM and Forest Service exchange process promotes the consolidation of federally owned land. Most explicitly, in
weighing the public interest, administrators are required to consider the interests of “better Federal land management.”181 This
directive pushes the agencies to examine land management in a
given area more broadly, encouraging them to think geographically
about opportunities to consolidate adjacent federal holdings and
scattered inholdings.182 The exchange process also promotes public
land consolidation through indirect channels. The other interests
given weight under the FLPMA’s broad and disparate “public interest” standard—encompassing, notably, both economic development and conservationist considerations—may leave the BLM and
Forest Service with vague guidance, torn between coalitions that
often share dissimilar objectives.183 But both proponents of growth
and proponents of conservation can realize benefits where fragmentation is reduced.184 Because the exchange process provides a
voice to these disparate interest groups, opposition can be tempered where a clearly fragmented parcel is being exchanged.185
178. Id. § 2201.1-1(c).
179. Id. § 2201.1-1(e).
180. Id. § 2201.1-1(f).
181. 43 U.S.C. § 1716.
182. See 36 C.F.R. § 254.3(b)(2)(ii) (2021) (with respect to Forest Service exchanges,
providing for the consideration of management objectives on “adjacent Federal lands”). Congress envisioned modern land exchanges as part of a regional and ongoing approach to land
planning. See Paul, supra note 159, at 113; see also John W. Ragsdale, National Forest Land
Exchanges and the Growth of Vail and Other Gateway Communities, 31 URB. LAW. 1, 12
(1999) (discussing the authority to use exchanges to address management objectives impaired by private inholdings within national forests); Lovett, supra note 176, at 361 (internal citation omitted) (discussing the use of exchanges as a means of improving land management and consolidating ownership).
183. See Brown, supra note 161, at 248 (arguing that the regulatory scheme for FLPMA
land exchanges “fail[s] to illuminate a workable definition of the public interest”).
184. See supra section II.A.
185. For example, a private company can obtain a fragment parcel that carries development value (by virtue of being surrounded by private land) and minimal conservation value
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Moreover, exchanges conducted by both the Forest Service and
BLM are generally initiated by an outside party.186 While the role
played by outside private parties in the exchange process has been
a source of criticism,187 it also helps bridge the information asymmetry that fragmented land can create. The federal government
lacks the resources to identify, investigate, and propose exchanges
across its vast checkerboard of public landholdings.188 Using outside parties to instigate the process provides a way to address intermingled property that may not have been identified otherwise.
It also mitigates against agency inertia; once a proposal is submitted, the BLM and Forest Service are not obligated to proceed on
the proposal, but the receipt of a proposal alone can be an impetus
to action.189 For all these reasons, land exchanges under the
FLPMA have been credited with reducing public land fragmentation in the West.190
C. Critiques of the Federal Exchange Model
Commentators have broadly criticized federal land exchanges.
Because land exchanges may involve valuable property and other
resources, they create opportunities for administrative abuse.
(also by virtue of being surrounded by private land); in return, the government can receive
property in an area where its default retention policy better serves recreation and conservation uses. See Kenneth Amaditz, Note, Executive Authority to Perform Interstate Land
Exchanges, 15 J.L. & POL. 195, 201 (1999) (“The exchange approach has won the support of
business interests and the tepid approval of environmental advocates . . . .”).
186. See Beaudoin, supra note 157, at 240, 240 n.103.
187. Brown, supra note 161, at 243 (discussing the outsized role played by private timber
companies in the federal exchange process).
188. See Monson, supra note 41, at 259 (discussing the Government Accounting Office’s
2009 findings that a lack of qualified staff was a contributing factor to the decline in federal
land exchanges); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing data issues that
arise with respect to fragmented land).
189. See 43 C.F.R. § 2201.1 (2020).
190. See Stengel, supra note 158, at 568 (“Land exchanges between the federal government and private individuals or corporations are increasingly being used as a way to consolidate public land holdings . . . .”); Culp & Marlow, supra note 157, at 1 (discussing land
exchanges as a means of “consolidate[ing] land ownership”); Brown, supra note 161, at 236
(describing land exchanges as a “solution to the age-old problem of intermingled ownership
of land”). Even the Government Accounting Office, which has issued reports critical of federal land exchanges in practice, has noted their utility for reducing fragmented public ownership. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-00-73, REPORT TO THE RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BLM AND
THE FOREST SERVICE: LAND EXCHANGES NEED TO REFLECT APPROPRIATE VALUE AND SERVE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 7 (2000) (“Since 1981, the [BLM and Forest Service] have used exchanges to dispose of fragmented parcels of land and to consolidate land ownership patterns
to promote more efficient management of land and resources.”).
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There are a number of documented cases of illegal or questionable
land exchanges that seemingly transferred a valuable property out
of public ownership without receiving appreciable public benefits
in return.191 The BLM and Forest Service have been criticized for
inconsistent decision making that has at times run afoul of the regulatory scheme.192 Private parties involved in exchanges with these
agencies tend to be repeat players, largely represented by corporations in the resource extraction industry.193 These parties have received economic windfalls from their participation in exchanges
made under the FLPMA.194 Less common, although no less glaring,
is the practice of real estate speculation in an area surrounded by
BLM or Forest Service landholdings; the private purchaser then
uses their fragmented parcel as a cudgel to extort a favorable land
exchange out of the government.195 Outsized media coverage of
these episodes casts a pall over the broader exchange process.196 In
addition, the appraisal component of the exchange process has
been criticized, in part due to deficiencies in the appraisal process
itself—characterized by insufficiently independent appraisers and
an often slow-moving timetable—and in part because the value of
remote and fragmented public land is often difficult to accurately
capture.197 A report issued by the Government Accounting Office
identified examples where property was exchanged to a private
party that subsequently resold the land at a substantially higher
price.198
As a result of widespread criticism, the use of administrative
federal exchanges has declined markedly in recent years.199 Even
191. See Miller, supra note 40, at 217–19 (discussing the issue of abuse and providing
several examples); Stengel, supra note 158, at 579 (providing additional examples).
192. Monson, supra note 41, at 259–60; Beaudoin, supra note 157, at 243.
193. Paul, supra note 159, at 117.
194. Culp & Marlow, supra note 157, at 25.
195. See Ragsdale, supra note 182, at 24–25 (discussing the “escapades” of Tom Chapman, a Colorado developer who has successfully pursued this technique in multiple areas
surrounded by Forest Service land).
196. See, e.g., Jason Blevins, Controversial Real Estate Speculator Alone in the Wilderness, DENV. POST (May 10, 2010, 3:34 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2010/05/10/contro
versial-real-estate-speculator-alone-in-the-wilderness [https://perma.cc/6JRT-FZLU].
197. Paul, supra note 159, at 118. The agencies have adopted more stringent appraisal
policies in recent years. See Monson, supra note 41, at 260.
198. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 190, at 3.
199. Miller, supra note 40, at 216 (“The [Bureau of Land Management’s] exchange transaction rate was more than twenty times higher in the 1990s than during the period 2004
through 2008, and the Forest Service completed four times as many land exchanges annually during the 1990s.”); see also Monson, supra note 41, at 259; Culp & Marlow, supra note
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so, a number of commentators—among them some of the BLM and
Forest Service’s strongest critics—continue to argue that the
FLPMA land exchange process is better than the alternatives.200
These commentators emphasize that federal exchanges address
management issues and reduce fragmentation, while at the same
time granting agencies the flexibility to craft creative solutions to
thorny development questions.201 For every infamous exchange
that appeared misguided or corrupt and drew the public’s attention, proponents of the concept can point to other exchanges, more
often falling under the radar, that indeed advanced significant
public interests.202 Indeed, citing several of these arguments, one
commentator goes a step further and advocates for “massive land
exchanges” as a way to reduce fragmentation.203
D. Applying the Federal Model to Interlocal Land Exchanges
Local governments and state legislatures can learn much from
the imperfect federal model. As demonstrated above, fragmented
federal land is the product of historical policy decisions that differ
significantly from the forces that bred fragmentation at the local
level.204 The nature of property managed by the BLM and Forest
Service is also assuredly different from the vacant urban parcels
owned by public entities in Mechanicsville and East Garfield Park.
These differences yield land management and redevelopment challenges that likely vary appreciably between federal and local governments. Yet even if the challenges are different, they are exacerbated by fragmentation at both levels. Federal and local
administrators must grapple alike with property that is

157, at 3.
200. Paul, supra note 159, at 128; Monson, supra note 41, at 264; Culp & Marlow, supra
note 157, at 1, 11; Ragsdale, supra note 182, at 22; see also Stengel, supra note 158, at 569
(“While the GAO Report recommended that Congress impose a moratorium on the current
land exchange program, other critics of land exchanges favor agency reforms over a complete
ban.”).
201. Paul, supra note 159, at 128; Stengel, supra note 157, at 568; Brown, supra note
161, at 237; Ragsdale, supra note 182, at 33.
202. See, e.g., Culp & Marlow, supra note 157, at 19 (discussing the public aversion in
Arizona to land exchanges and remarking that “[m]ost trust land stakeholders believe . . .
that it is unfortunate that a handful of egregious misuses of the tool have poisoned the
atmosphere for appropriate uses to rationalize land ownership patterns in the state”).
203. Coggins, supra note 160, at 394.
204. See supra Part I.
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geographically splintered.205 As a remedy to fragmentation, moreover, both federal and local administrators are constrained in their
ability to ameliorate the problem through strategic land assembly
outside of an exchange process.206
At the same time, land exchanges offer a practical solution to
fragmentation, one borne out by the successful use of administrative land exchanges under the FLPMA over the past half century.
The salient features of the federal model offer a replicable framework. Despite declining significantly from their heyday of the
1990s, administrative exchanges are still statutorily incentivized
and regularly performed, signifying a systematic approach to federal land consolidation that does not exist in local government.207
The federal model is particularly attractive in the context of interlocal land exchanges between two public entities. The critiques
levied against administrative exchanges under the FLPMA—
which emphasize deficiencies in the appraisal process, cases where
the public interest was not protected, and notorious examples of
windfalls received by corporate parties—expose problems that are
necessarily unique to public-private transactions. In a land swap
between local governments, these problematic features of the administrative exchange process are not necessarily implicated. The
public is certainly liable to mistrust its local government, and local
governments each other,208 but a land exchange where all property
remains in public ownership does not trigger the same concerns
and does not require an appraisal to ensure it is effectuated in the
public interest.
Anecdotal evidence supports this intuition—that federal land
exchanges have faced criticism over the past twenty years not because exchanges themselves are flawed, but because exchanges
specifically between the federal government and private landowners raise fears, sometimes rooted in reality, that a private owner
205. See supra section II.A.
206. Compare, e.g., supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (discussing local hurdles
with property acquisition by purchase and eminent domain), with supra notes 167–70 and
accompanying text (discussing similar hurdles at the federal level).
207. Data from the BLM indicates the agency completed eight exchanges in 2019.
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, P-108-9, PUB. LAND STAT. 2019, at
50 (2020), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/PublicLandStatistics2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N82B-2U3Q].
208. See section III.B (examining mutual mistrust in the context of interlocal agreements).
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will lobby, extort, or otherwise maneuver its way into a sweetheart
deal. Unsurprisingly, examples of problematic exchanges in the legal literature have been of the public-private variety.209 A similar
unstated distinction appears to hold true at the local level: while
exchanges between public and private owners are susceptible to
controversy, public-public exchanges are not.
The distinction is borne out by two recent high-profile exchanges
that occurred months apart in Detroit. In early 2019, the Detroit
City Council approved a development deal with Fiat Chrysler to
build a new car factory in Southwest Detroit, a largely residential
area of the city struggling from years of divestment. In order to
assemble 215 acres of land for the development, the City engaged
in land exchanges with a handful of the largest private landowners
in the region.210 The exchange was controversial and bitterly contested. Opponents noted that the private landowners benefitting
from the transaction were speculators and investors who enjoyed
close ties with City leadership; these private parties—notably billionaires Matty Moroun and Anthony Soave, along with one of Detroit’s largest landowners, Michael Kelly—had a track record of
unscrupulous behavior regarding their real estate investments,
and had in some cases invested strategically in land that later became necessary for the factory development.211 These landowners
were deeply unpopular among Detroiters.212 It is perhaps not surprising that the optics of the land exchange were so poor. The

209. See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 176, at 365–66 (critiquing a federal exchange with a
mining company); Brown, supra note 161, at 235, 239 (arguing for reform in the exchange
process based upon a proposed exchange with a timber company); Miller, supra note 40, at
201 (arguing for reform based upon an exchange with a private landowner); Hanson &
Panagia, supra note 172, at 182 (critiquing an exchange with a timber and real estate company).
210. See Allie Gross, Morouns, Speculators Look Like Winners in Detroit Land Swap to
Ensure FCA Factory Jobs, DET. FREE PRESS (May 20, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.freep.
com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2019/05/20/speculators-moroun-detroit-land-swapfca-jobs/3664661002 [https://perma.cc/L5YA-7SJ9]; Steve Neavling & Maryam Jayyousi,
Detroit City Council Narrowly Approves Controversial Land Swap for Fiat Chrysler Plant,
DET. METRO TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2019
/05/21/detroit-city-council-narrowly-approves-controversial-land-swap-for-fiat-chryslerplant [https://perma.cc/5HA6-NDJH].
211. See Gross, supra note 210; Neavling & Jayyousi, supra note 210.
212. See Gross, supra note 210 (“‘For decades, Matty Moroun and his businesses have
been the worst neighbors in southwest Detroit, polluting our communities, stealing public
land, and letting their properties crumble and turn into nuisances,’ said U.S. Rep. Rashida
Tlaib, who grew up in southwest Detroit and has been working to hold Moroun accountable
for years.”).
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private land required for such a large-scale assembly was inevitably owned by those with significant holdings in the city, and these
private owners, in part as a result of their vast property inventories, also had historical track records of causing friction in local
neighborhoods, on the one hand, and working closely with City officials on the other. High-profile public-private exchanges are
prone to these messy realities.
By comparison, only a few months earlier, the City of Detroit
engaged in another high-profile land exchange: it transferred an
eleven-acre site located adjacent to the prosperous Midtown neighborhood in exchange for a dilapidated and environmentally challenged industrial property.213 The exchange received broad media
coverage.214 In light of the apparent value of the land the City relinquished, the exchange could have been controversial. But here
the City’s trading partner was not a disliked local billionaire but a
local government agency, the Wayne County Land Bank.215 Concerns of speculation, patronage, and private windfall—so inherent
to public-private exchanges in practice—dissipated once private
parties were removed from the equation.
In practice, then, the criticism that haunts public-private exchanges largely evaporates where public-public exchanges are contemplated. At the federal level, despite the critiques leveled at the
BLM and Forest Service over the past couple decades, as summarized above, significant public-public exchanges have nevertheless

213. Dana Afana, Land Swap Between Detroit and Wayne County Approved as Part of
Fail Jail Fix, MLIVE MICH. (Apr. 6, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/
2018/04/wayne_county_commission_approv.html [https://perma.cc/8GWL-NGTF].
214. See id.; Dana Afana, Former AMC Site Part of Land Swap for Gilbert Soccer Stadium Plan, MLIVE MICH. (Oct. 5, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/2017
/10/jail_site_2.html [https://perma.cc/PP98-HEFB]; Nicquel Terry, Wayne Co. Commission
OKs Land Swap for Gilbert Jail, DET. NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2018/04/05/gilbert-land-swap-jail-deal/33567101/
[https://perma.cc/6F5B-PRHS]; Kirk Pinho, Proposed Land Swap Between County, City Another Step Toward Gilbert’s Jail Site Plan, CRAIN’S DET. BUS. (Oct. 5, 2017, 9:00 AM), https:
//www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20171005/news/641251/proposed-land-swap-between-coun
ty-city-another-step-toward-gilberts [https://perma.cc/UT5N-2C92]; Emma Winowiecki,
Wayne County and City of Detroit Swap Land to Move Forward With Jail Plan,
MICH. RADIO (Oct. 5, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.michiganradio.org/news/2017-1005/wayne-county-and-city-of-detroit-swap-land-to-move-forward-with-jail-plan [https://per
ma.cc/T76U-YJ3A].
215. See Afana, supra note 214.
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proceeded successfully without triggering any of the same substantive concerns.216 The distinction holds true at the local level as well.
V. THE MUDDLED LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERLOCAL
LAND EXCHANGES
The success of administrative land exchanges under the FLPMA
can offer guidance and inspiration to local administrators. Just as
at the federal level, while interlocal land exchanges may not represent an incisive attempt to address the underlying causes of
checkered public property, they offer a practical first step forward.
Yet a glaring problem remains unaddressed. On the ground, consolidating surplus public land in a given neighborhood may appear
a no-brainer. But the governing legal framework does not always
comport with practicality. Instead, in many states, it is not clear
that local public entities have authority under current law to conduct land exchanges with other public property owners. In other
states, moreover, local exchange authority does plainly exist—but
it comes saddled with procedural requirements that especially pose
impediments where a public-public exchange is contemplated.
In both cases our inquiry starts with state law. Local power is
broadly a product of state law, stemming either from statutory enactments or constitutional grants.217 Some local governments enjoy
broad and liberally construed home rule powers that protect its action in areas of local concern, a grant that may appear more than
sufficient to permit the exchange of public property.218 Yet the inquiry does not end there. Even where liberal home rule grants are
conferred by a state constitution, these grants are ordinarily made
only to general purpose governments, in many cases only to
216. See, e.g., John C. Ruple, The Trump Administration and Lessons Not Learned from
Prior National Monument Modifications, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 14, 34, 56–57, 66 (2019)
(discussing a successful exchange between Utah and the federal government that reflected
the largest land exchange in continental United States history and providing additional
similar examples of public-public exchanges in the context of national monument land).
217. See generally Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV.
1163, 1165 (2018). The classic case holding that municipal governments are mere creatures
of state control is Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
218. See, e.g., City of Commerce v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002) (noting that
home rule cities in Colorado may regulate in areas of “local concern”); O’Neill v. City of E.
Providence, 480 A.2d 1375, 1379–80 (R.I. 1984) (finding, in a condemnation case, that a city
had not complied with the provisions of state law, but not disrupting the city’s broad charter
authority to “acquire property” in general).
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municipalities—and even then, often only to a subset of municipalities that satisfy certain population parameters or other requirements.219 Home rule is thus unavailing where public land is fragmented not simply between two municipalities, but between an
assortment of general and special purpose local governments—perhaps a county, city, park district, and school district—that do not
all have home rule power.
As a consequence, the power to conduct interlocal land exchanges is generally anchored to a specific delegation made under
state law.220 Where state law affirmatively empowers local entities
to exchange land, local codes and local officials have the flexibility
to follow suit.221 Some states have statutory regimes that clearly
and independently vest local governments with broad interlocal exchange power. In South Dakota, for example, section 6-5-1 of the
South Dakota Codified Laws provides as follows:
All counties, municipalities, sanitary districts, improvement districts,
townships, and school districts of this state may exchange with each
other and to transfer and convey from one to the other any land or
property belonging to them and under their respective jurisdictions
and to perform and exchange work between themselves. All transfers
of property and work as authorized by this section shall be upon such
terms and conditions as may be determined and agreed upon by the
respective governing bodies thereof.222

219. See Evins v. Richland Cnty. Historic Pres. Comm’n, 532 S.E.2d 876, 878 (S.C. 2000)
(“Home Rule applies only to counties and municipalities, not special purpose districts.”).
Some states grant constitutional home rule to municipalities and only statutory home rule
to counties. See Michael R. Heim, Legal Article: Home Rule: A Primer, J. KAN. BAR ASS’N,
Jan. 2005, at 26, 30. Other states do not provide for county home rule more broadly. For
example, the Minnesota Constitution permits local governments to adopt a home rule charter, but enabling law only exists for cities to pursue this process. With the exception of a
special law that allowed one county to explore a home rule charter, there is no authority
generally for counties to adopt a charter in the state. See Deborah A. Dyson, State-Local
Relations, MINN. HOUSE RSCH. (2019), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/sslc
strel.pdf [https://perma.cc/596Z-AZL9].
220. To be sure, where liberal and clear state grants do exist, local authority to exchange
property may also turn on the language of a local ordinance or charter. While an examination of local ordinances and charters is outside the scope of this Article, the discussion below—particularly of whether the ability to “sell” property encompasses the ability to “exchange” it—also applies to some local laws, where the terms also are not clearly defined or
interpreted. See McKinney v. City of Abilene, 250 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
221. See, e.g., Doll v. Flintkote Co., 79 So. 2d 575, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1955), aff’d, 91 So.
2d 24 (La. 1956) (state statute governs municipal exchange of property); Cabana v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough, 50 P.3d 798, 803 (Alaska 2002) (applying a local ordinance modeled
after the state statute governing exchanges when a local government’s land exchange was
challenged).
222. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 6-5-1 (2021).

2022]

CONFRONTING THE LOCAL LAND CHECKERBOARD

713

By this language, section 6-5-1 provides a broad and explicit
grant to perform interlocal exchanges. The use of the word “exchange” indicates an independent power, separate and distinct
from an entity’s authority to buy or sell property.223 The statute’s
authorization further encompasses most local governments in the
state, not simply municipalities.224 Its scope broadly covers “any
land or property belonging to” these entities.225 And finally, its procedural constraints are minimal and deferential: an interlocal
agreement may proceed “upon such terms and conditions as may
be determined and agreed upon” by the governmental parties to
the transaction.226
Section 6-5-1’s permissive grant also withstands scrutiny when
assessed against the larger statutory scheme, as it is not sidelined
or complicated by another provision of the South Dakota Codified
Laws. Other South Dakota statutes permit counties and municipalities to exchange land for public purposes—again “upon such
terms and conditions as may be determined and agreed upon” by
the entities—and others clarify that properties transferred between political subdivisions of the state need not be offered for sale
first or conveyed for cash consideration.227 At the same time, if a
local government wishes to exchange property with a private party,
the transfer must follow an appraisal, a public notice, and a hearing.228
Taken together, South Dakota’s statutory scheme is clear. Local
governments may exchange property with each other free of appraisal, auction, pricing, or other procedural constraints. Governments may also exchange property with private parties, but in
these cases certain procedures must be followed. The cumulative
impact of these statutes is twofold. First, they expressly empower
interlocal exchanges without limitation. Second, they incentivize
governmental entities to pursue public-public exchanges as
223. Id.
224. Section 6-5-1 appears to cover all notable local entities that own property in South
Dakota. It excludes some special purpose districts that operate on the local level. See, e.g.,
id. § 46A-10B (drainage basin utility districts); id. § 34A-16 (regional recycling and waste
management districts); id. § 49-17A (regional railroad authority). Yet the section includes
all general-purpose local governments and likely covers the vast majority, if not the entirety,
of surplus local public land.
225. Id. § 6-5-1.
226. Id.
227. Id. §§ 7-29-20, 6-5-2.
228. Id. § 6-5-4.
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opposed to public-private ones. Under either situation, local administrators can ultimately act in reliance on section 6-5-1, confident in the clarity of its grant.
A few other state legal regimes approach the clear interlocal exchange grant that exists in South Dakota.229 But these examples
are rare. More commonly, whether local governments have the
ability to exchange land with each other is a question to which
state constitutions and statutes—and the courts interpreting
them—offer only a muddled answer. At best, without this clarity,
the validity of an interlocal exchange may be questioned by a
stakeholder or challenged and ultimately upheld in court. At worst,
the opaque governmental power in this space may dissuade local
administrators from even pursuing exchanges that would address
important land management and fragmentation issues.
A. Identifying the Problem
At the heart of this legal confusion lies a basic point of definition:
is the process of exchanging land—i.e., transferring one property
in exchange for another property—inherently different from the
process of acquiring or disposing of land? One could imagine an
exchange as merely a combination of property disposition (of the
parcel being transferred) and property acquisition (of the parcel
being obtained). In accordance with this perspective, an agreement
between two governments to “exchange land” would simply reflect
a shorthand articulation of two separate but intertwined steps:
first, the disposition of one or more parcels of land, and second, the
acquisition of one or more different parcels in return. Yet one could
also understand land exchanges as an inherently discrete concept
along the lines of the FLPMA’s scheme, one where the disposition
and acquisition steps are intertwined to the degree that a new process has been born.
Historically, courts interpreting exchange statutes have tended
towards the first view—that exchanging property is an inextricable function of either acquiring property, selling property, or both.
The Supreme Court of the United States set the tone in 1895, when
it remarked that if a county was authorized to sell property for

229. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1800 (Repl. Vol. 2018) (local exchanges in Virginia);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-54-2 (2021) (intergovernmental exchanges in New Mexico).
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consideration, there is no reason, absent an express provision otherwise, that the county could not also exchange a property by “selling [it] for money’s worth.”230 State courts have traditionally often
endorsed a similar perspective and concluded that exchanges are
inherently inseparable from sales.231 Central to this concept is the
nongratuitous nature of both transactions: both exchanges and
sales are supported by consideration. Both involve conveying property for something in return, whether a monetary payment of cash
or an in-kind payment of property.232
Yet other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Rather
than approaching the issue of consideration from a functional perspective by asking whether the transferring entity got something
in return, these courts have emphasized the formal, definitional
distinctions that exist between cash and noncash consideration. In
Fox v. Mayor of Chambersburg,233 a Pennsylvania court was asked
whether an interlocal conveyance that involved both property and
cash consideration constituted an “exchange.” After surveying several dictionary definitions, the court found that “[a]ll of these definitions contemplate a simple bartering of one interest for another
of similar value.”234 Therefore a more “complex” transaction—one
that, as in Fox, may involve cash and other consideration alongside
the properties themselves being swapped—moves beyond a simple
barter and outside the realm of exchange.235
Similarly, in Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell,236 the Arizona
Supreme Court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions where
courts have defined the word “exchange,” concluding from this review that “[t]he commonly accepted definition of ‘exchange’ excludes transactions into which money enters, either as the consideration furnished by one party or as a basis for measuring the

230. Roberts v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 158 U.S. 1, 18 (1895).
231. In California, for example, the California Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n law,
an exchange is two sales.” Robbins v. Pac. E. Corp., 65 P.2d 42, 56 (Cal. 1937); see also House
v. McMullen, 100 P. 344, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909) (“[T]here can be no doubt that plaintiff
. . . could prove that ‘sale’ was used for ‘exchange,’ which is indeed a species of sale.”).
232. See, e.g., Bobo v. City of Spartanburg, 96 S.E.2d 67, 71 (S.C. 1956) (finding that
“[t]he power to buy and sell includes the power to exchange” because “the transaction is
supported by . . . consideration”).
233. 744 A.2d 808 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
234. Id. at 809.
235. Id. at 809–10
236. 790 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1990).
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value of the property transferred.”237 Drawing on these definitions,
the Fain court articulated a test: if two properties are being
swapped on the basis of a “fixed value . . . measured in terms of
money,” the transaction should be considered a sale; if not, only
then is it fairly defined as an exchange.238
Accordingly, by definition, both Fain and Fox demand that land
exchange transactions occur absent any cash consideration. The
effect of this viewpoint is to segregate sales and exchanges into distinct spheres. Because sales and acquisitions generally involve
cash payment, or at minimum carry a sense of fixed monetary
value, those processes are mutually exclusive from the simple barter that characterizes a land exchange.
The above discussion demonstrates that courts provide fundamentally divergent answers when asked to determine whether
land exchanges are unique. Some ultimately conclude that exchanges are merely a subset or mechanism of property sale and
acquisition. Others decide that sale and acquisition are mutually
exclusive of the process of exchange. But why does this divergence
matter? More pointedly, for purposes of this Article, why—and
how—does this divergence muddle interlocal exchange authority
under state laws?
The answer lies less in the difference between the two approaches than it does in their inconsistent application. In theory,
if judicial doctrine offered a consistent answer to the question of
whether exchanges are unique, legislatures could respond accordingly by crafting a statutory scheme on the understanding that an
exchange is—or is not—a discrete form of property transfer. At the
same time, if legislatures offered a consistent approach to the question, courts would be better equipped to discern legislative intent
as part of a deliberate statutory scheme.239 Consistency is a hallmark of clarity. Where courts or legislatures are not consistent in
their understanding of land exchanges, cracks are liable to form in
the regulatory framework, sowing confusion as to a local government’s authority to exchange land—and its obligations when doing
so.

237. Id. at 246–47.
238. Id. at 247 (internal citation omitted).
239. See Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 50 P.3d 798, 802–03 (Alaska 2002) (looking to legislative intent to discern the meaning of the word “exchange”).

2022]

CONFRONTING THE LOCAL LAND CHECKERBOARD

717

This latter scenario reflects reality. Both courts and legislatures
take an inconsistent approach to the question of land exchanges,
in turn spawning a body of law that is internally contradictory and
disharmonious. On the legislative side, two state statutes may
each ostensibly empower local land exchanges while also imposing
apparently contradictory procedural requirements. Louisiana offers a case in point. Section 33:3741 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes gives municipalities authority to “exchange any public property owned by said municipality . . . with property owners for any
public purpose.”240 Properties exchanged under this section must
be appraised and carry approximate equal values.241 A separate
statutory provision, also located in the same chapter of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, grants municipalities the power to “sell,
lease . . . , exchange, or otherwise dispose of . . . any property.”242
Here, section 4712 requires that the municipality must first establish a minimum price and terms, and in some situations must also
advertise and solicit proposals, prior to disposing any property.243
Taken together, sections 3741 and 4712 are difficult to harmonize. The first demands an appraisal but contemplates that an exchange may be negotiated privately by a municipality before the
transaction is publicly consummated. The second requires that a
municipality take certain public actions upfront by setting a minimum price and at times soliciting bids, both of which would necessarily constrain an entity’s ability to negotiate exchanges for specific property it is hoping to acquire or consolidate. Sections 3741
and 4712 also appear premised on fundamentally different concepts of exchanges. While section 3741 applies only to the “exchange” of property, section 4712 applies to a laundry list of property disposition mechanisms, “exchange” simply included as one of
the listed options.244 In doing so, section 3741 treats exchanges as
a separate and unique form of acquiring and selling property,
whereas section 4712 views an exchange as a mere subset of property sales.245 It is perhaps unsurprising that section 3741 provides
municipalities latitude to conduct private negotiations before taking any formal procedural steps. Inherent to the concept of
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:3741 (2021).
Id.
Id. § 33:4712.
Id.
Id. §§ 33:3741, 33:4712.
Id. §§ 33:3741, 33:4712.
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exchanges being unique—and inherent to the broader land exchange goals of consolidating property and reducing fragmentation—is the ability to negotiate privately with specific owners and
for the ownership of specific properties. Section 3741 arguably
acknowledges this goal. Section 4712 does not.
The interplay between these provisions has caused confusion for
local governments.246 In an attempt to harmonize the two, an Attorney General opinion commented that section 3741 focuses more
on the acquisition of property while section 4712 focuses on property disposition.247 Deciding which statute to apply therefore turns
on the intent of the local entity: if its primary goal is to acquire a
particular property, the requirements of section 3741 should apply,
while section 4712 applies where the primary goal is the disposition of surplus property.248 This conclusion provides little guidance
to municipalities contemplating an interlocal land exchange. In a
scenario where two municipal governments own property they
seek to exchange with each other, which of the two sections applies? On the possibility that section 4712 may apply, should each
municipality treat the transaction as a sale, by first setting sale
terms and a minimum price, or should they proceed to negotiate a
like-for-like transfer that resembles more exclusively an exchange?
Other statutory schemes demonstrate similar inconsistencies and
raise similar questions.249
Courts, too, have struggled to take a consistent approach to land
exchanges. The Fain decision discussed above—which found that
a transaction based upon a fixed value constitutes a sale—posed
challenges for subsequent Arizona courts. Along the reasoning of
Fain, a transaction should be deemed a sale where two properties
were appraised before being swapped, or where, as part of a swap,
a cash payment was made to equalize a difference in market values
between the two parcels. The appraisals would indicate that property included in the transaction was being assigned a monetary
value; the cash payment would defy Fain’s plain reasoning by including monetary consideration in the deal. Yet courts found
246. For example, the City of Alexandria, Louisiana sought to exchange property with
private parties and requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to whether section
3741 or 4712 applied. See La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-273 (1994).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Tuten v. City of Brunswick, 418 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Ga. 1992) (analyzing GA.
CODE ANN. § 36-37-6).
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themselves confronted with statutes that seemed to contemplate a
broader definition of “exchange”—in some cases where an appraisal was included notwithstanding Fain’s reasoning.250
The conundrum forced courts to depart from Fain. Rather than
relying upon the dictionary definition of “exchange” to conclude
when and how it deviates from a sale, legislative intent became the
new barometer.251 Fain’s categorical rule gave way to a statute-bystatute assessment, one that asks whether the legislature intended
exchanges to be unique in that specific legal scheme. As one Arizona court stated after conducting this assessment, “[t]herefore,
despite the Fain court’s statement that an exchange is a form of
sale, in these statutes, the legislature has clearly distinguished an
exchange from a sale.”252
In this manner, inconsistent legislative and judicial approaches
to land exchanges coalesce to create a murky doctrine, both in the
language of the law itself and in its recognized application. The
legal inconsistency that hounds land exchanges has a real impact
on interlocal exchange power. Where exchanges are interpreted by
courts as part-and-parcel components of property sale or acquisition, additional procedural requirements are often brought into
play, rendering interlocal public exchanges functionally onerous to
pursue. Conversely, where exchanges are interpreted by courts as
independent and unique transactions, local governments may lack
authority to exchange public property as a consequence of legislative silence.
B. Exchanges as Inseparable from Land Acquisition and Sale
First, when exchanges are viewed as components of property
sale or acquisition, a public owner seeking to exchange land must
also comply with procedural requirements that would govern sale
or acquisition under similar circumstances. Rather than being held
only to the express statutory procedures associated with

250. Mackey v. Mayor & Council of City of Tucson, 96 P.3d 231, 233 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
251. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text.
252. Mackey, 96 P.3d at 234 (emphasis added). Indeed, the quoted text from Mackey
speaks to the degree judicial confusion exists when assessing land exchanges, as Fain did
not state that “an exchange is a form of sale.” See Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 790
P.2d 242, 247 (Ariz. 1990) (“Thus, the test for determining whether a transaction constitutes
a sale or an exchange is whether there is a fixed value at which the exchange is to be made—
it is considered a sale if there is a fixed value and an exchange if there is not.”).
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exchanges, a government may thus also be subject to the procedures associated with selling property and the procedures associated with acquiring property.253 The issue at its core is a matter of
basic arithmetic: the more conveyance mechanisms encompassed
by an exchange, the more processes may apply, and therefore the
more steps a local administrator must navigate to ensure a land
exchange is valid.254 For example, where a municipality must get
an appraisal before acquiring property and hold a public hearing
before approving a sale, a cautious administrator will aim to check
each of these boxes when pursuing an exchange—along with any
additional requirements specifically tied to exchanges themselves.
These additional layers of process may carry added costs and political constraints, threatening the success of a transaction or discouraging its pursuit in the first place.255 Only rarely have courts
recognized that the procedural steps demanded of land exchanges
may conflict with the government’s normative purpose for pursuing one.256
The issue is particularly stark in states that facially provide
broad authority for interlocal exchanges. In Washington, section
253. See Swims v. Fulton Cnty., 475 S.E.2d 597, 598 (Ga. 1996) (exchanges as a method
of acquisition and subject to acquisition procedures); Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 250
S.E.2d 68, 73–75 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 259 S.E.2d 558 (N.C. 1979) (exchanges as a
method of sale and subject to disposition procedures).
254. See, e.g., Tuten, 418 S.E.2d at 368–71. In Tuten, the Georgia Supreme Court opined
on the interplay between GA. CODE ANN. § 36–37–6(a) (2021), which carried bidding requirements for the sale of municipal property, with GA. CODE ANN. § 36–37–6(c) (2021), which
provided that “nothing herein shall prevent a municipality from trading or swapping property with another property owner, if said trade or swap is deemed to be in the best interest
of the municipality.” Id. at 368–69. The city argued that section 36–37–6(c) contained a
plenary grant to exchange property without the bidding requirements. See id. at 369–70.
The Supreme Court disagreed: “[T]o read O.C.G.A. § 36–37–6(c) as a plenary grant of the
power of ‘trading’ and ‘swapping’ city property generates logical possibilities that only can
be described as bizarre. For example (and bearing in mind the statutory limitations upon
the sale of city property), a city is prohibited from selling $600 worth of scrap iron unless it
complies with the bidding requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36–37–6(a). Yet, it could ‘swap’ or
‘trade’ the city hall itself for a goat!” Id. at 370 (emphasis in original).
255. See Campbell, 250 S.E.2d at 73–75 (because an exchange of property is also a “private sale,” a local redevelopment authority’s exchange was unlawful where it didn’t comply
with public hearing and fair market value requirements of a sale).
256. Of the opinions cited in this Article, the most explicit acknowledgment is found in
State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.3d 878, 888–89 (N.M. 2011). Even while finding certain
public-private exchanges invalid for failing to comply with procedural auction requirements,
the court acknowledged their underpinning purpose: “We should be candid about the objectives of these particular exchanges. They were designed to achieve a predetermined result.
The exchanges were for the purpose of addressing specific land management problems in
specific geographical regions—checkerboard areas—that could only be resolved by privately
negotiated exchanges with neighboring landowners.” Id. at 899.
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39.33.010 of the Revised Code appears to confer upon local governments a clear, explicit, and flexible grant to exchange public property with each other. The statute provides that “any municipality
or any political subdivision [of the state]” may between them “exchange . . . any property . . . on such terms and conditions as may
be mutually agreed upon by the proper authorities of the state
and/or the subdivisions concerned.”257 In the following paragraph,
the statute proceeds to expressly signal legislative intent to grant
a standalone power: “This section shall be deemed to provide an
alternative method for the doing of the things authorized herein,
and shall not be construed as imposing any additional condition
upon the exercise of any other powers vested in the state, municipalities or political subdivisions.”258
Notwithstanding this language, however, and premised on the
view that exchanges are inseparable from property sales, Washington courts have complicated section 39.33.010’s plain reading
by imposing additional layers of process. In multiple cases, other
statutes have been harmonized with—and thereby layered upon—
the terms of section 39.33.010.259 Most notably, in Heermann v.
City of Woodland,260 a Washington court sought to reconcile section
39.33.010 with section 43.09.210 of the Revised Code, which requires, in part, that property transferred from one local agency to
another be priced at its “full value.”261 The Heermann court
acknowledged that section 39.33.010 appeared facially in conflict
with section 43.09.210. The first provides local governments unfettered discretion to transfer property upon mutually agreeable
terms; the second demands strict compliance with market pricing
and would likely require an upfront appraisal.262 Splitting the difference, the court settled on a comprise approach: it concluded that
governments transferring property under section 39.33.010 are obligated to negotiate for “full value,” but that this term has a flexible

257. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.33.010 (2021).
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Heermann v. City of Woodland, No. 30823-1-II, Wash. Ct. App. LEXIS
481, at *19–21 (Mar. 22, 2005); Davis v. King Cnty., 468 P.2d 679, 680–81 (Wash. 1970).
The Davis court was analyzing a version of section 39.33.010 that has since been revised,
but the core holding that section 39.33.010 operates in tandem with another statutory provision, section 36.34.130, was not premised on the obsolete language. Id. at 680–81.
260. 2005 Wash. Ct. App. LEXIS 481, at *19–21.
261. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 39.33.010, 43.09.210 (2021).
262. See Heermann, 2005 Wash. Ct. App. LEXIS 481, at *19–21.
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and circumstantial meaning, permitting public owners a degree of
latitude in demonstrating that adequate value was received.263
Heermann’s conclusion poses a challenge for local administrators. Unable to rest on the permissive language of section
39.33.010, local public owners have been saddled with additional
hurdles when seeking to effectuate a valid exchange. Critics of a
proposed exchange also have an added source of ammunition when
aiming to challenge the exchange and sway opinion against it.
Even so, by adopting a compromise approach, Heermann nevertheless avoided a more problematic outcome. The court rejected an argument, advanced by the appellants, that the local entity must obtain an appraisal and strictly satisfy “full value” before proceeding
with the transaction.264 Appraisal and equal value requirements
are particularly fatal to interlocal exchanges. Where both parties
to the exchange are local public entities and both are subject to this
same statutory provision, the exchange is functionally only viable
where the properties being exchanged appraise at the same
amount. The chances are low that two parcels being swapped in
the interest of consolidation also happen to appraise independently
for the same value.
Unsurprisingly, then, statutory schemes that demand appraisals and equality of value have sidelined exchanges designed to reduce local land fragmentation.265 These demands reflect an understandable concern that public owners and private developers might
engage in sweetheart exchange deals.266 But local governments
wishing to exchange fragmented property are caught in the crosshairs.267

263. Id. at *20–21.
264. Id.
265. Witt v. Borough of Maywood, 746 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1998), aff’d,
328 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2000) (analyzing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12-16 (West 2021));
Finn v. Mayor of Norwood, 592 A.2d 283, 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (finding invalid an exchange designed to “do away with small spot lots that are contiguous with larger
Borough owned pieces and [] help consolidate the ownership of larger tracts of property into
the Borough”); Finn v. Mayor of Norwood, 545 A.2d 807, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
266. See supra section IV.D.
267. Equally fatal to interlocal exchanges, although less prevalent, is the requirement
that properties be offered for public auction or bid prior to disposition. An auction or bid
necessarily anticipates cash consideration being paid for a property, rendering it fundamentally incompatible with the like-for-like negotiations that characterize an exchange. See
State ex. rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.3d 878, 897–98 (N.M. 2011) (“We recognize that bargaining and negotiation between buyers and sellers or between buyers prior to a sale negates
the essence of what it means to have a public auction free and open to competition. Rather
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C. Exchanges as Distinct from Land Acquisition and Sale
If the confusion between exchanges and sales forces compliance
with too many statutes, and therefore too many layers of process,
the second issue set forth above—the inconsistent tendency to treat
exchanges as a unique conveyance mechanism—threatens the opposite outcome: it risks interpreting legislative silence as an implicit prohibition where interlocal exchanges are concerned, especially in states where general purpose local governments do not
enjoy constitutional home rule immunity. This legislative silence
can take several forms. In Utah, for example, a statutory provision
grants local governments the ability to acquire property from, and
sell property to, another government for agreed-upon consideration.268 The statute raises a relevant question along the lines discussed above: does its language provide for interlocal exchanges
where the agreed-upon consideration is another piece of property,
rather than cash? Viewing the question in a vacuum, an observer
may answer in the affirmative, guided by the belief that the power
to buy and sell property between two public entities necessarily
confers the power to exchange. But what if other parts of the larger
statutory scheme—and indeed, other provisions of the same act—
appear to treat interlocal exchanges as unique, separate, and distinct from other interlocal transactions?269
In the absence of any other on-point authority or home rule
grant,270 our original question has been complicated. Perhaps the
legislature intended its grant of sale and acquisition to encompass
exchanges. Perhaps it did not. Or perhaps the legislature did not
consciously consider the question of interlocal exchanges either
way. In any event, in the absence of judicial direction otherwise,
the statutory scheme has clouded a local entity’s exchange power.
On the risk that exchanges will be interpreted as unique transactions, thereby elevating the legislature’s silence from an innocuous
than seeking the highest financial gain through objective means, negotiation and bargaining design a satisfactory exchange for two parties to the exclusion of the public.”).
268. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-13-214 (LexisNexis 2021).
269. Id. § 11-13-202 (differentiating between local governments “providing” and “exchanging” services).
270. The Utah Constitution grants “charter cities” home rule power with respect to “municipal affairs.” UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5. Yet municipalities must still rely upon delegated
legislative authority if they have not adopted a charter, Provo City v. Ivie, 94 P.3d 206, 209
(2004), and it appears only one municipality in Utah operates under a home rule charter.
See Amended Tooele City Charter, TOOLE CITY, https://tooelecity.org/wp-content/uploads
/2014/03/AmendedCityCharter01-02-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4MW-ZCH5].
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omission to an implicit prohibition, any interlocal exchange will
proceed under a shadow of doubt.
Legislative silence is even more deafening in places where a
number of closely related, specific exchange grants have been made
to local governments, yet when viewed together these specific
grants leave significant holes in a public entity’s exchange power.
In Ohio, a collection of statutes employ identical language in authorizing local owners to exchange property, free from competitive
bidding, with various other public entities—with a regional arts
and culture district,271 a county transit board,272 a regional transit
authority,273 a regional transit commission,274 and a port authority.275 Other Ohio statutes allow townships to exchange property
without public bid and for cities and school districts to exchange
property upon mutually beneficial terms.276 Municipalities also
hold general power—under both statute and the Ohio Constitution’s home rule provision—to sell surplus public property.277
Missing in all these grants is a basic articulation of interlocal
land exchanges. Imagine that a city and county wish to exchange
surplus property; what source of legal authority can they rely
upon? Do they have plenary power to pursue an exchange? And
furthermore, if yes, are the city and county obligated to offer the
properties for competitive bidding first? One could argue that the
Ohio Constitution and Ohio Revised Code have forged a comprehensive scheme that leaves no room for our hypothetical citycounty exchange. Under certain circumstances, a public owner
may be permitted to exchange property, and under certain circumstances that owner may be able to proceed without a competitive
271. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3381.19 (LexisNexis 2021).
272. Id. § 306.06.
273. Id. § 306.51.
274. Id. § 306.86.
275. Id. § 4582.38 (for port authorities created after July 9, 1982); id. § 4582.121 (for port
authorities existing on July 9, 1982).
276. Id. § 505.104 (township exchanges); id. § 3313.40 (city and school district exchanges).
277. Id. § 721.01; see also Young v. City of Dayton, 232 N.E.2d 655, 656 (Ohio 1967) (the
Ohio Constitution’s grant to municipalities to exercise “local self-government” includes the
power to convey surplus public property). The Ohio Constitution also endorses property exchanges “for industry, commerce, distribution, and research, to make or guarantee loans
and to borrow money and issue bonds or other obligations to provide moneys for the acquisition, construction, enlargement, improvement, or equipment, of [] property, structures,
equipment and facilities.” OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 13. The plain reading of this language
does not cover exchanges of surplus property to reduce fragmentation.
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bid process. But otherwise, the comprehensive scheme arguably
serves to create an implicit prohibition wherever no explicit grant
exists.
These questions and arguments again underscore the uncertainty—or at minimum, the potential for uncertainty—that characterizes local land exchanges. Efforts to consolidate fragmented
land are prime victims of the resulting legal muddle. The issue
comes to a head most conspicuously in jurisdictions where public
owners are expressly encouraged to exchange land in the interest
of consolidation—yet where legislative silence nevertheless still
clouds interlocal exchange power. Section 94.3495 of the Minnesota Statutes offers a compelling example. The law empowers the
State of Minnesota to exchange land with local governments upon
the approval of a statutorily created land exchange board.278 In
granting this authority, section 94.3495 recognizes exchanges as a
unique form of property conveyance and squarely identifies land
fragmentation as its overriding purpose. “The purpose of this section is to expedite the exchange of public land ownership,” the statute reads. “Consolidation of public land reduces management costs
and aids in the reduction of forest fragmentation.”279
This language indicates that the legislature not only considered
and understood the problem of land fragmentation, but also that
intergovernmental land exchanges were identified as a solution
Minnesota law should promote. Even so, section 94.3495 is plainly
limited to exchanges conducted by the state, and no similar law
addresses exchanges between local entities with the same degree
of breadth. Instead, as in Ohio, a constellation of statutes provides
local governments only with specific exchange authority under specific circumstances.280 Just as in Ohio, then, local administrators
are confronted with uncertainty when pursuing an exchange with
another local government. Even more so than in Ohio, however,
the statutory scheme in Minnesota highlights the core issues explored in this Article: local exchange authority is clouded notwithstanding a clear legislative intent to address fragmented public
land at the state level.

278. MINN. STAT. § 94.3495 (2021).
279. Id.
280. See id. § 500.222 (local governments may exchange land for certain agricultural
property); id. § 282.13 (certain cities may exchange certain tax-forfeited property); id.
§ 448.21 (certain cities may exchange property to be used as parks or playgrounds); id.
§ 282.01 (Minneapolis may exchange certain tax-forfeited property).
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D. The Resulting Muddle
The end result is a muddled body of law and local power. Even
where the value of intergovernmental land exchanges is understood—and especially where it is not—the ability of local entities
to exchange surplus public land is a question that too often falls
through the cracks of the controlling legal framework. Due to inconsistent perspectives on the inherent nature of exchanges, it is
not always clear that local authorities are empowered to exchange
property with other public owners. Where such power does exist,
moreover, it often comes saddled with layers of procedural requirements that threaten to pose hurdles for any land exchange, and it
may especially complicate interlocal ones. Indeed, the legal authority for public-private exchanges counterintuitively appears clearer
than the authority to engage in public-public exchanges, notwithstanding the greater capacity for abuse that hounds the former.281
The functional impact of this murky regime is evident, as a number of the cases cited in this Article found a local government’s exchange invalid on procedural or ultra vires grounds.282 But the
more widespread impact is likely subtler in nature: the legal
framework discourages local government administrators from
even exploring exchanges, driven by the possibility and fear that
their authority rests on less-than-firm grounds. When an interlocal
exchange is actually consummated, the risk still remains that the
exchange can later be questioned as invalid. In an environment
where stakeholders are prone to inertia,283 even the shadow of risk
can effectively dissuade meaningful action, all the more so where
such action is not piecemeal or bilateral in nature (e.g., a one-time
exchange of trail parcels in Bloomington, Indiana284) but rather
more systematic (e.g., an assembled exchange between multiple
public owners).

281. See supra section IV.D.
282. See, e.g., Finn v. Mayor of Norwood, 592 A.2d 283, 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); Heermann v. City of Woodland, No. 30823-1-II, 2005 Wash. Ct. App. LEXIS 481, at
*22 (Mar. 22, 2005); Tuten v. City of Brunswick, 418 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Ga. 1992); Campbell
v. First Baptist Church, 250 S.E.2d 68, 75 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); Fox v. Mayor of Chambersburg, 744 A.2d 808, 810 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Young, 232 N.E.2d at 656; see also State
ex. rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.2d 878, 901 (N.M. 2011) (in the context of school trust land).
283. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text.
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The outcome is a sharp contrast from the federal land exchange
model. At the federal level, exchanges are expressly authorized and
facilitated, thereby creating a systematic approach to land consolidation under the FLPMA’s process.285 The FLPMA offers a procedural rubric for exchanges and establishes land consolidation as a
normative value. With few exceptions, the concept and fundamental rationale of exchanges do not exist in the local government legal
framework. Instead, when it does occur, an exchange is more often
a one-off transaction, conducted piecemeal and for purposes of a
specific project.286
In this manner, land exchanges speak to the larger problem of
opaque local government power. A local entity may arguably hold
authority to take a given action, but where the scope or existence
of local power is not clear, governments are necessarily hesitant to
explore an idea and less likely to act.287 A local government’s apparent, perceived, or intended power is not always in lockstep with
the power it can comfortably wield in practice.288 In certain areas
of governance, a local entity may be motivated to implement policy
notwithstanding any confusion about the state of the law because
the policy addresses an issue of significant political import to the
community or its leadership. Public land fragmentation does not
enjoy this measure of momentum. In these cases, robust plenary
grants of local authority are especially crucial. It is not sufficient
that a local government might have the power to conduct land exchanges. Rather, here, the controlling legal framework should expressly and affirmatively confer the power, as a consequence of
both facilitating the process and shaping norms as to its inherent
value.
CONCLUSION
Fragmented public land is ubiquitous across American cities.
Left alone, the current status quo serves to make publicly owned

285. See supra section IV.B.
286. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text (providing an example of a one-off
local government exchange); supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text (providing another
example).
287. This issue was explored in DAVID J. BARRON, GERALD E. FRUG & RICK SU,
DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE: LOCAL POWER IN GREATER BOSTON (2004). The authors interviewed local government officials in the Boston area and found a “general confusion regarding home rule authority” that regularly prompted “administrators to abandon a
course of action.” Id. at 9–12.
288. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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surplus property more a hindrance than an asset, imperiling development and stewardship objectives even as local governments
face deepening economic malaise. There is no miracle cure for the
issue. Yet compared with the alternatives, land exchanges offer a
practical and politically palatable solution. The concept acknowledges that underpinning fragmented land lies fragmented resources, political power, and political will. A land exchange does
not require government leaders to muster the same degree of resources, power, and will that other possible solutions—such as
ownership consolidation or interlocal agreements—may entail.289
And land exchanges have a proven track record at the federal level
of reducing public land fragmentation.
The initial challenge, therefore, is to start bridging the gap between the plain practical value of land exchanges and the murky
legal framework that unevenly empowers them. Promoting interlocal exchanges as a viable tool for public land consolidation requires legislative action in most states. To transform the law of
local land exchanges—from a clouded and inconsistent framework
to an explicit and affirmative one—legislatures in many states can
look to those jurisdictions where their counterparts have more
squarely addressed the issue. A couple states have specifically endorsed land exchanges as a response to fragmentation.290 A couple
others have not used the same purposivist language, but have still
created a legal scheme that clearly authorizes interlocal exchanges
in practice.291 Both approaches offer valuable guidance.
Yet any meaningful attempt to encourage land exchanges on a
systematic basis would be remiss to overlook the federal model, as
codified under the FLPMA, and particularly the creative and adaptive concept of assembled exchanges. Of course, while federal laws
and initiatives do not neatly translate at the state and local levels,292 the central principles of the federal exchange approach are
289. See supra section III.A (regarding ownership consolidation); supra section III.B (regarding interlocal agreements).
290. See IDAHO CODE § 31-808 (2021) (authorizing county exchanges in order to “consolidate county real property”); MINN. STAT. § 94.3495 (2021) (“The purpose of this section is
to expedite the exchange of public land ownership.”).
291. See supra notes 222–28 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory exchange
framework in South Dakota).
292. See Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the
Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 404–05 (2002) (discussing
distinctions of institutional competency between local and nonlocal governments); Davis,
supra note 15, at 128 (arguing, in the context of public land management, that “the political
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nevertheless applicable. Any effort to incorporate these principles
into state law would draw upon the success of the FLPMA, particularly with respect to public-public exchanges, and it would make
an unambiguous statement—to local administrators, judges, and
members of the public alike—that exchanges offer a valuable tool
in the public land administration toolbox.
In particular, four salient features of the federal model could facilitate and encourage interlocal land exchanges.
First, drawing upon § 206(a) of the FLPMA, local public landowners could be granted express plenary authority to conduct interlocal land exchanges, notwithstanding and independent of any
other general authority to acquire and dispose of property.293 Such
authorization would clearly signal that exchanges are viable and
useful land management tools. In light of existing precedent, moreover, an exchange scheme should go a step further in distinguishing between interlocal land exchanges, on the one hand, and the
acquisition and disposition of property on the other. It should also
expressly contrast a grant to conduct interlocal exchanges with
public-private property transfers, mitigating against a concern
that the legislature has created a loophole divorced from common
sense.294
Second, drawing upon § 206(b) of the FLPMA, local public owners could be tasked specifically with considering the interests of
“better [public] land management” when assessing a potential exchange, a consideration that would incorporate the goal of land
consolidation as a solution to fragmented public property holdings.295 Indeed, a hypothetical exchange scheme at the local level
could be even more explicit than the federal model in promoting
consolidation as a paramount objective; instead of one factor
among a group of competing considerations that inform an agency’s

behaviors and dynamics embedded [at the local government level] are not necessarily a miniature version of the federal land management model,” but “[r]ather, intrinsic differences
exist between the structure and nature of federal and local agencies”).
293. 43 U.S.C. § 1716; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-318274, BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT AND GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION—SELECTED LAND
TRANSACTIONS 2 (2010) (“Although BLM has specific authority to sell land, this authority is
separate and distinct from its authority to exchange land.”).
294. See, e.g., supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions made
in South Dakota’s statutory scheme between public-public and public-private exchanges).
295. 43 U.S.C. § 1716; see also supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing the
interest of consolidation as promoted in the FLPMA framework).
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assessment of “public interest,” the issue of fragmentation and concept of consolidation could be elevated to the forefront.
Third, as with the federal regulatory framework—which provides that “[e]xchanges may be proposed by the [agency] or by any
person, State, or local government”296—a scheme for interlocal public land exchanges could expressly permit any local governmental
entity (for example, any municipality, county, special purpose government, or other subdivision of the state) to propose a land exchange to another governmental entity. Similar to the federal
model, creating a proposal mechanism combats administrative inertia by encouraging parties to submit proposals and receiving entities to consider them.
Finally, interlocal exchange authority could endorse and promote the use of assembled land exchanges as an adaptive response
to fragmented public property. Given the procedural value of embarking upon assembled exchanges,297 the statutory scheme could
push local governments to start this process and enter into expansive agreements to pool, assemble, and redistribute land. As with
land exchanges more generally, this encouragement could take the
form of a proposal mechanism, whereby one local government can
formally propose an assembled exchange agreement to one or more
other entities. The power to propose an assembled exchange could
likewise be given to residents via a ballot initiative or referendum.
Drawing upon the federal model, significant flexibility should be
baked into the grant such that local administrators and stakeholders have sufficient time to construct and conduct the exchange’s
component transactions.
These salient features of the FLPMA scheme would meaningfully promote the systematic use of land exchanges among local
governments, who would be empowered to pursue exchanges in the
interest of consolidation. Indeed, the very juxtaposition in local
power—between a limited ability to sell property to private parties
and a permissive ability to conduct public exchanges—may well incentivize public-public consolidation not simply as an affirmative
goal, but also as an alternative to more procedurally burdensome
public-private disposition or land assembly efforts.
These measures may also offer secondary interlocal benefits. If
governments are expressly empowered to submit an exchange
296.
297.

43 C.F.R. § 2201.1 (2020).
See supra section III.D.
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proposal to other public owners or enter into an assembled exchange pool, the process may facilitate conversations about mutual
interests in land management more broadly, even if the exchange
itself does not ultimately come to fruition. A failed exchange could
also promote introspection. Perhaps the exchange failed because
one or more entities did not have clear data or disposition policies
in place.298 Here, the failed exchange may offer a wakeup call for
public administrators to review their property holdings and attendant management practices.
The fragmentation of public land is a multifaceted local government issue. Its causes are diverse, as are its adverse effects. The
externalities posed by fragmentation—on local management, governance, and power—are very real, yet low visibility places the issue on the political backburner. For these reasons and more, there
is no easy, magic pill solution to the problem of fragmentation. Yet
land exchanges promise a starting point. They offer a relatively
simple and palatable mechanism for ameliorating thorny land governance issues. A significant impediment remains, however: the
use of interlocal land exchanges depends upon, and is limited by,
an inconsistent and often murky legal scheme, with interlocal exchange power often falling between the cracks of local authority. It
is apt time to shore up these cracks in the law and keep pace with
practicality.

298.

See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.

